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| 1 |
ID:
189345
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Islamic State (IS) was founded on the premise of a “new ideological” offer based on extreme takfir as an alternative to Al-Qaeda ideology i.e. Salafism-Jihadism. More specifically and ideologically speaking, IS ideology rested on the alliance between three schools of thought: the Neo-Takfiri, the Bin Ali, and the Hazimiyah. However, instead of coalescing into a single coherent thought, those three schools confronted each other in a violent internal strife that caused the death of hundreds of its members including key leaders, endangering the very existence of this organization. This paper shows that instead of opting for a clear ideological line, the IS leadership of neo-takfiri orientation, alternated its support for each of these, between the Bin Ali and the Hazimiyah, resorting each time to severe internal purges. Using interviews with former foreign fighters jihadists in addition to other relevant materialFootnote1, this paper analyses the origins and ideological foundations of these three schools and seeks to explain the patterns of conflict as well as the perspectives for a possible reconciliation between them in the wake of the death of Al Baghdadi.
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| 2 |
ID:
156852
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| Summary/Abstract |
On January 2013, a terrorist group linked to the organization al-Mourabitoune1 stormed the In Amenas natural-gas facility, Algeria's “economic lung.” Over 800 people were taken hostage, among them 100 foreign workers. Threatening to kill the hostages and destroy the facility, the terrorists demanded the release of all Algerian jihadists and the withdrawal of French troops from northern Mali. Against expectations, Algerian authorities made it clear from the outset that they had no intention of either giving in or letting the terrorists leave Algeria. As a result, the national Special Forces were quickly dispatched to the area and surrounded it. During the standoff, a first group of jihadists tried to leave the facility with several hostages in their vehicles. However, the Special Forces poured a relentless barrage of fire on them to prevent them from escaping, causing the deaths of all the terrorists present in those vehicles and many of their hostages. Then, the Special Forces stormed the facility itself and killed the remaining jihadists.2 During these two assaults, 32 foreign hostages were killed.
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| 3 |
ID:
174658
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| Summary/Abstract |
On April 4, 2019, General Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) and the strongman of the Al Bayda government, a Libyan faction associated with the “Tobruk Parliament,” launched an assault on the capital, Tripoli, in a final bid to conquer the country. Indeed, Libya has been divided since 2014 between the government of Tripoli, called the Government of National Accord (GNA), formed under UN mediation in December 2015, and the Al Bayda government, which emanates from the Tobruk parliament. Beyond a rivalry between the two groups, this represents a conflict between regional and international powers, each backing one of the warring parties.
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| 4 |
ID:
178928
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper, based on numerous interviews conducted with former jihadists, argues that the emergence of the Islamic State, more than an organizational rift, has led to a major paradigm shift within the jihadi organizations. As such we argue that the Al Qaeda salafi jihadi paradigm, i.e., the “Peshawar paradigm,” has gradually evolved over the years, becoming more in phase with the realities of the battlefield and less dogmatic, explaining this organization’s constant resilience in spite of many setbacks and leading to the rise of a new thinking which we call “the Idelb Paradigm.” Conversely, the ISIS jihadi paradigm, which we call “the Raqqa Paradigm,” stems from the Takfiri school of thought. While not new and already present in the 1980s in Afghanistan, the Takfiri school of thought has been gaining momentum over the years and emerged as a major to the Al Qaeda one. This schism is likely to have a long-term effect on the strategies and alliances of the respective affiliates of both Al Qaeda and ISIS.
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| 5 |
ID:
186013
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| Summary/Abstract |
North Africa is often perceived to be vulnerable to threats from returning jihadist fighters coming home from campaigns in Syria and Iraq, especially in the aftermath of the Islamic State organization's 2019 collapse. This article, however, argues that the danger posed to the Maghrib by foreign fighter returnees is less acute than predicted. The reasons for this diminished threat include the civil war in Libya, disaffection due to intra-jihadist infighting, and North African states' programs offering rehabilitative pathways to former radicals in exchange for cooperation.
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| 6 |
ID:
167915
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| Summary/Abstract |
In March 2015, an assault in Tunis on the Bardo Museum by the Okba Ibn Nafaa Jihadi Brigade, affiliated with al‐Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), led to the murder of 24 foreign tourists. In June of the same year, the city of Sousse was assaulted by ISIS, an attack in which 39 foreign tourists were killed. Worse, in March 2016, ISIS launched another strike, this time to take control of the border city of Ben Guerdane, known for its hostility to the central government in Tunis. This time, however, the Tunisian security services, supported by the local population, repelled the attack and inflicted heavy losses on ISIS. Three attacks, three events summarize the paradox of the trajectory of jihadi organizations in Tunisia.
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