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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
190863
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article introduces the “Boko Haram disaggregation problem,” or the often frequent failure by observers to disaggregate the group following its August 2016 split into two distinct factions, instead, labeling and studying all factions as “Boko Haram.” It asks: What are the origins of the “Boko Haram disaggregation problem,” and, given this phenomenon, what are the possibilities and constraints in understanding profiles of violence between the pre-2016 and post-2016 iterations of the group(s)? It argues that the “Boko Haram disaggregation problem” has origins both internal and external to the group(s), most prevalent in quantitative academic research. Highlighting the challenges of this phenomenon, it uses data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) from 2009 to 2018 to compare profiles of violence between various “Boko Haram” factions. In sum, it shows why beyond merely a methodological challenge, overcoming this phenomenon has real-world impacts for addressing the violence perpetrated by these groups.
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| 2 |
ID:
156907
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article focuses on the so-called “brutalization” of terrorism. The brutalization thesis as part of the larger theoretical concept of “new terrorism” argues that “new terrorism” is more brutal than “old terrorism.” Many scholars claim that the 9/11 attacks mark the beginning of a new era of terrorism that has lifted international as well as domestic terrorism to a new level of violent brutality. Others argue that this process had already started in the early 1990s. After discussing possible ways to operationalize a brutalization of terrorism, for example focusing on suicide bombings or terrorist attacks against soft targets, this article tests the empirical credibility of the brutalization thesis regarding both potential starting points. Data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) shows that only three out of nine indicators increased significantly during the 1990s, partially backing the idea of a general brutalization, whereas increasing numbers of suicide attacks and beheadings after 9/11 support the notion of a qualitative change in terrorism and its brutality connected with the idea of maximizing media and public attention. Yet, these developments are regionally limited and the brutality of this “new terrorism” exceeds the levels known from the zenith of “old terrorism” in the 1970s and 1980s in only a few cases.
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| 3 |
ID:
191482
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the reliability of “terrorism” classifications within the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by looking at its inclusion criteria as well as filtering mechanisms for ensuring quality case inclusion. Using several descriptive analyses, this article examines how various measures within the GTD affect researcher’s ability to adequately analyze various patterns or trends of offending. The underlying limitations of the data, namely data inclusion, the defining of terrorism, and inconsistency in labeling events are examined. It is concluded from the analyses that what is being defined as terrorism matters downstream when examining the data, given that it is used to make inferences about groups, movements, or the efficacy of governmental policy. Since scholars often lack a proper “error” framework for assessing the quality of big data derived from open sources on terrorism, it makes it difficult for scholars to assess the quality of the data itself. As a result, researchers are encouraged to include an error framework within the GTD for academics to assess the quality of the data they are plugging into their models. Results, limitations, and recommendations are further expanded upon within.
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