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| 1 |
ID:
157296
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article empirically evaluates whether the adoption of market mechanisms such as auction, tender and quotation for land-use rights acquisition effectively reduces illegal land use in China. It is based on official statistics of (i) illegal land use cases and areas; and (ii) adoption rate of market-led transactions in 30 provinces from 1999 to 2008. A fixed effects panel model is used to control for factors like land revenue dependency, law enforcement, per capita gross domestic product, government size, real estate investment, relative wage in public sector and citizens’ level of education. The findings demonstrate that the market mechanism is effective in reducing illegal land use. However, the Chinese government needs to close legal and institutional loopholes in the land administration regime in order to improve the effectiveness of market-led transactions in reducing land corruption.
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| 2 |
ID:
157298
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Why do central state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China enjoy rapid development while, overall, the state-owned economy is experiencing a contraction? The extant theories have separately argued that the support of the central government and compliance with market requirements are the driving forces behind the success of central SOEs. However, these theories have neglected the local governments’ role in the expansion of central SOEs. This article contends that variations in provincial fiscal capacity have contributed to the development of central SOEs. If a province has a weak fiscal capacity, local governments welcome central SOEs to merge with their local SOEs. In this way, the local governments can save up the fiscal grants intended for local SOEs and promote local economic development. At the same time, central SOEs gain access to the resources and expand their markets by merging with the local SOEs, thereby strengthening the central SOEs. On the contrary, if a province has a strong fiscal capacity, the local government will invest a large amount of fiscal resources to help its local SOEs survive. As a result, the expansion of central SOEs is hindered in such type of province. This article uses paired comparison of two provinces in China, Zhejiang and Liaoning, to test this hypothesis.
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| 3 |
ID:
157299
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In view of China’s “going out” programme, this article argues that mainland Chinese firms have not made significant breakthroughs in the Southeast Asian automobile sector, primarily because of a competitive and still consolidating marketplace, various national regulations of Southeast Asian countries and the need to dovetail their own corporate goals with those of their Southeast Asian partners. Meanwhile, mainland Chinese firms have made major advances in the Southeast Asian electronics sector by offering low prices and high-quality products and services. In addition, they also collaborate with marketing firms that possess intimate knowledge of the marketplace.
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| 4 |
ID:
157293
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Why are Chinese university graduates, who in the past avoided socio-economically backward rural areas, willing to start their careers in such areas today? This research argues that the Chinese authorities have promoted “grassroots employment” for university graduates through preferential policies together with the values of “socialist citizenship”. However, the preferential policies actually reflect a different value of “instrumental utilitarianism” which resonates well with the dominant youth culture. This article examines the promotional strategies of four “grassroots employment” programmes in order to determine whether the popularity of the four programmes is due to the success of “socialist citizenship” or to the preferential policies. The benefits, difficulties and prospects of achieving the objectives of these “grassroots employment” programmes are briefly evaluated. The main conclusions are that the authorities have used “socialist citizenship” as a camouflage and that the preferential policies have accentuated youths’ enthusiasm to join the programmes.
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| 5 |
ID:
157294
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why do local officials across China respond differently to societal challengers? In this article, the authors analysed six recent and influential social protests in China—the Dongyang protest (2005), Xiamen protest (2007), Weng’an protest (2008), Shanghai Anti-MagLev Railway Project protest (2008), Shenzhen protest (2008) and Shishou protest (2009). The article demonstrates that disparities in state capacity noticeably affect the trajectories of contentious collective actions and shape government responses in China. Local states in China respond to social protests by dynamically and vigorously assessing their capacity as the social protest develops, and by weighing the probable effectiveness of control measures designated for the locale.
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| 6 |
ID:
157295
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| Summary/Abstract |
Based on intensive fieldwork in a district in China, this article illustrates that “power–interest networks” (quanli liyi wangluo) work as pre-existing tools for social control, specifically to govern residents’ behaviour when they engage in any protest against the state. The networks originated from an institutional setting in which local authorities have been the largest resource grabber and where personal ties have mainly determined resource allocation decisions. Residents who are capable of using networks to operate via the back door thus get rich, but their dependence on networks also poses constraints on their anti-demolition protests. By contrast, residents who are incapable of using networks tend to lag behind, but their marginalised status unexpectedly offers them greater autonomy to negotiate a better bargain with local authorities. The differences reveal a “half-open” state control through resources allocation, which seems to work for residents who have intensive interactions with local authorities but not for others who are self-sufficient. The existence of networks sheds light on the importance of local politics in determining Chinese protests and has not been amply discussed in recent years. Networks also reinforce the operational rationale of “relational repression”, shaped not only by sanctions and sentiments but also by benefits.
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| 7 |
ID:
157297
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The default of a large number of informal finance schemes in China has caused enormous financial losses, and therefore has potential social and political significance. Analysing 354 defaulted schemes from 1989 to 2015, this study defines how they differ from other types of informal finance. It also produces an ideal-type representation of the default process and concludes that the default results from greed, increasing financial pressure at the individual level and private enterprises’ restricted access to state bank loans at the institutional level. China’s financial system should be more flexible in order to prevent further financial losses through informal financial relations.
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| 8 |
ID:
157300
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article contributes to the understanding of innovative behaviour in China’s large and medium-sized firms and hence the role of Chinese firms in innovation. The empirical analyses are based on firm-level survey data. Innovation has important implications not only for the transformation of the Chinese economy but also for the rest of the world as Chinese firms become increasingly active internationally. Specifically, this article explores the factors underlying the propensity, intensity and persistence of research and development (R&D) spending in Chinese firms.
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| 9 |
ID:
157292
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the late 1970s, China has undergone large-scale socio-economic transformations, which have enormously impacted its governance. The evolution of the central administration of labour provides an appropriate sample illustrating how market transition (or economic marketisation) and globalisation affect the government system in China, and how a new mode of governance gradually takes shape against this background. Being the national agency in charge of policymaking and administration of labour and employment, the central administration of labour, i.e. Ministry of Labor, has played a pivotal role in (re-)structuring the national economy. Since the reform, the administration has undertaken periodic institutional, structural and functional changes. This article, first of all, proposes an analytical framework for the study. Second, it examines how the central administration has reacted to the external environment and responded to changes in the context of marketisation, nation-building and globalisation. Third, it identifies the salient features of this new mode of labour governance, and by referring to stimulus-response theory, attempts to further theorise it.
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