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| 1 |
ID:
169952
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| Summary/Abstract |
India-China border has not been formally demarcated and there are areas where both sides have differing perception of Line of Actual Control (LAC), and its perception on ground have led to a number of skirmishes and standoffs, Doklam being the most recent. The differentiating factor in this standoff was that it took place in a third country, Bhutan. This crisis will remain an important indicator of Indian and Chinese strategic behaviour in any future crisis between the two emerging powers. This will also reflect on India’s relations with other countries in South Asia and vice versa. A major aspect of Indian strategic behaviour that emerged from this crisis was that India can play the game of military brinkmanship and win it.
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| 2 |
ID:
159534
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| Summary/Abstract |
Sino-Indian relations, which have long been fraught, took an especially adverse turn this summer with a military-to-military confrontation on the Doklam Plateau near the India-Bhutan-Tibet trijunction. After several weeks, Indian and Chinese forces withdrew from the region. However, neither side resiled from their respective territorial claims. This episode exemplified the troubles that have come to characterize the Sino-Indian relationship, especially since Prime Minister Modi assumed office in 2014. His regime, which is more nationalistic and reposes greater faith in the utility of force in international politics, had initially sought to diplomatically court the PRC in the hopes of improving their bilateral relationship. However, these efforts did not prove successful. Instead, the People’s Liberation Army, as in the past, continued to undertake limited probes along the Himalayan border, while the PRC continued to make diplomatic, commercial, and strategic inroads into India’s neighbours, trying to reduce India’s influence in those countries. The Modi regime, in turn, sought to counter these initiatives through various efforts of its own in the neighbourhood. Beyond South Asia, India has also sought to enhance its ties with Australia, Japan, the United States, and Vietnam in an attempt to hedge against the PRC’s growing economic and military assertiveness in Asia. These endeavours, however, have elicited hostile reactions from Beijing, which sees New Delhi as the only significant potential hurdle to the expansion of its influence in Asia. Despite Beijing’s adverse reactions it is unlikely that the current regime in New Delhi will scale back its efforts to cope with what it deems to be significant threats emanating from its behemoth northern neighbour.
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| 3 |
ID:
157334
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| Summary/Abstract |
To conclude, the military impasse was a result of China’s hegemonic and expansionist designs in Asia. China has territorial disputes with India. In recent times, has seen uncomfortable with strongly emerging strategic partnership of India with US and Japan. Its ambitions to reorder Asia hierarchically, while relegating position of India and Japan, is leading to its unilateral attempts to alter the status quo in the disputed territorial and maritime boundaries in South Asia, South East Asia and South China Sea.
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