| Summary/Abstract |
How does the acquisition of latent nuclear capabilities—in the form of enrichment and reprocessing facilities—affect a state’s military security and bargaining power? On the one hand, nuclear latency might serve as a “virtual deterrent” against would-be aggressors, as well as a bargaining chip in international negotiations. On the other hand, some research holds that states cannot deter military challenges without at least a deliverable nuclear device. Other scholarship suggests that a state’s pursuit of latency invites nonproliferation sanctions and preventive strikes. We address this debate by quantitatively investigating the conditions when latency benefits or burdens states in their international interactions. To do so, we analyze a dataset of latency measures and a variety of military and bargaining outcomes. The results suggest that latency invites coercion without producing deterrence. Our findings imply that post–Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), latency is more likely to undermine Iran’s economic and military well-being than it is to benefit its prosperity or security. That, in turn, suggests that the JCPOA will not increase Iran’s deterrent capability or its international influence, a fact that should temper fears about the negative consequences of the agreement.
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