| Summary/Abstract |
Continuous development of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and the
accompanying concern about the possible decoupling of the alliance between the
Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States have produced numerous opinions
on what should be done about North Korea’s nuclear program. While there are
discussions on conceptual possibilities of deterrent or compellent use of nuclear
weapons by North Korea, these discussions often fall short of making specific
connections between the relational nuclear capabilities between North Korea
and the United States, and their nuclear strategies. Such connection is necessary
in grasping a clear picture of the nuclear security environment of the Korean
Peninsula, and formulating possible policy responses the ROK should adopt
as a result. This article seeks to make this connection by analyzing the nuclear
capabilities and strategy of North Korea and the United States. It argues that
North Korea will be able to pressure alliance decoupling only if it is able to field
submarine–based ballistic missiles with an inter-continental range. The ROK should
seek to avoid this outcome by strengthening its own deterrence measures against
North Korea, seeking assurances on the U.S. alliance commitment, and seeking
measures that could reverse North Korea’s potential second–strike capability.
|