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| 1 |
ID:
157775
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| Summary/Abstract |
Building on the theoretical proposition that congruence is as much a property to be measured in authoritarian regimes as it is in democratic regimes, the aim of this article is to understand the phenomenon of ideological and political congruence in Angola. To carry out this analysis, we rely on two original surveys, conducted in 2012 with members of parliament (MPs) and college students (voters), covering equivalent policy issues. The results, to some extent exploratory, suggest moderate levels of congruence between MPs and voters. This article contributes to the existing scholarship through a case study that escapes a golden rule in this field – i.e., it is not a democracy. Moreover, it features congruence as a potentially relevant factor in understanding dominant parties’ persistence in authoritarian settings.
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| 2 |
ID:
185368
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| Summary/Abstract |
Equatorial Guinea is not only one of the world’s most authoritarian regimes but also a striking case of regime and leader survival. This small, oil-rich state and personalist regime defies conventional wisdom because it is both far more resilient and faces far fewer threats from within the regime and from opposition political parties than other resource-rich states. But how does the regime manage to survive? This study argues that four key mechanisms interact to explain Equatorial Guinea’s record of authoritarian survival. Firstly, co-optation (via patronage, party, and cabinet appointments) which President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo and the regime party—Partido democrático de guinea ecuatorial—have used to build internal cohesion and fragment opposition. Secondly, the crafting of restrictive institutional rules (party and electoral laws) that, combined with informal rules, aim to protect the regime’s interests and make participation in political opposition more costly. Thirdly, the use of (selective and diffuse) repression to shield the regime and shrink the living space of challengers. Finally, the regime’s international linkages and projection to gain credibility and offset pressure for change. We argue that autocrats’ survival depends on their ability to play a strategic two-level game: domestic and international.
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