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ID:
157788
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that global egalitarian accounts of global justice are insufficient and inappropriate to the task of thinking globally about justice. This article argues that the most pervasive approaches to cosmopolitanism, and in particular global egalitarian accounts, are of limited utility because they assume the existence of suitable preconditions which are absent, in particular the lack of a global reflective equilibrium. In so doing, they ignore the requisite precondition for their own thought to be either persuasive or possible as a basis for genuine conduct or institutional reform. This article argues that the task for cosmopolitan thought is to think about how cosmopolitanism can in the words of Richard Rorty be ‘shaped rather than found’ and what that would mean for how we construct accounts of global justice and other pressing cosmopolitan issues. It concludes that developing a theory of global justice requires at least a theoretical engagement with non-Western political thought.
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| 2 |
ID:
180012
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| Summary/Abstract |
Richard Rorty’s controversial works in various areas of epistemology, language, politics and philosophy have drawn intellectual attention worldwide. In Iran, Rorty’s own distinctive way of thinking has attracted the attention of intellectual and philosophical circles. This article explores how his thought as received by Iranian intellectuals has contributed to the development of their ongoing debate on tradition and modernity. A few Iranian intellectuals have tried to find in Rorty’s ideas a solution to what they perceive as their own society’s problems. In particular, they believe his notion of anti-foundationalism and his idea of the priority of democracy to philosophy are ways to reconcile their own traditional philosophical and doctrinal conceptions with modern democratic institutions.
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| 3 |
ID:
187676
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this article, I show that Richard Rorty’s unduly neglected normative political theory advances a far more distinct and demanding form of liberalism than is usually attributed to him. Attention to how Rorty understands solidarity—and its corresponding conception of public obligations—encourages analysis of his nonjuridical vision of liberal community. Through examination of his oft-ignored, revealing interpretation of Vladimir Nabokov and instructive comparison with the thought of Judith Shklar, I argue that, for Rorty, the sustainability of a liberal community requires an ethos of curiosity, whereby citizens feel moved to uncover and understand the personal experiences of cruelty and humiliation endured by others. We can make sense of this ethos and its demands of us through rethinking the idea of political conversation. This understanding of Rorty’s intellectual project not only enriches our appreciation of his complex political theory but also contests the meaning and implications of liberalism itself.
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