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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
169128
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| Summary/Abstract |
China’s relations with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have been progressively attracting attention in recent years. In the last decade, China sought to restore the “bridges” (Wasserstrom 2000) with the region that had existed in the period 1949–1989. Chinese policymakers have long contemplated their “return” to CEE (Tubilewicz 1998); however, they have found the right opportunity only in the period after the global financial crisis. The first trade and investment summit of China and the sixteen countries in the region—Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, (North) Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia—took place in Budapest in 2011. In 2012, the first summit of the heads of governments of China and the sixteen (collectively known as 16+1) took place in Warsaw. Ever since, these summits have been taking place once a year, while a web of coordinating institutions and mechanisms spanning a number of policy fields has been also established. There is now a whole new universe of interactions involving governmental actors on the national, regional/provincial, and local levels, state-owned and private enterprises, think tank(er)s, and media professionals, as well as other people-to-people exchanges, which now take place with growing frequency and contribute to development of China–CEE relations.
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| 2 |
ID:
169134
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| Summary/Abstract |
Narratives about the challenges of China’s growing involvement with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) for the region and the EU are exponentially proliferating and have already effectively monopolized the understanding of this relationship among scholars, analysts, media, and policy-makers in the Western European capitals. The Western Balkans, as a sub-region of CEE, are thought of as particularly prone to Chinese influence—the countries in this geographical area are not EU members nor are fully integrated in the EU’s policy and legislative frameworks and initiatives yet are interested in maximizing the economic benefits of their relationship with China. By strategically developing ties with the Western Balkans, China is understood to have, or is well on the way to achieve, profound impact in this region. This paper focuses on three policy areas perceived to be both the most important channels and the clearest expressions of China’s influence in the Western Balkans—foreign policy, physical infrastructure and connectivity, and investment. Using the notion of the structural power for its analytical framework, this study finds that while the attention has been on China’s growing presence in the region, the extent to which the EU has since moved to re-assert its leadership in the Balkans has gone under the radar. The paper concludes that in recent years Brussels has reformulated its agenda so as to bind the Balkan states to its own policies and objectives, constraining their ability to independently shape their relationship with Beijing.
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| 3 |
ID:
157811
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| Summary/Abstract |
Vying for high-speed railway projects overseas has become a prominent feature of China's diplomacy in recent years, including in Southeast Asia. These efforts have been widely depicted within the premises of the China Threat narrative – as a part of Beijing's agenda to alter the power balance in Southeast Asia at the expense of the economic, political, and security well-being of countries in the region. This paper challenges such interpretations and concludes that these projects do not have either the intention or capacity to facilitate such a hostile and far-reaching agenda toward the region.
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