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ID:
157831
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| Summary/Abstract |
We model an infinitely repeated Tullock contest, over the sharing of some given resource, between two ethnic groups. The resource is allocated by a composite state institution according to relative ethnic control; hence the ethnic groups contest the extent of institutional ethnic bias. The contest yields the per-period relative influence over institutions, which partly spills over into the next period, by affecting relative conflict efficiency. Our model generates non-monotone evolution of both conflict and distribution. Results suggest that external interventions, when effective in reducing current conflict and protecting weaker groups, may end up sowing the seeds of greater future conflict.
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| 2 |
ID:
189006
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| Summary/Abstract |
We present a game-theoretic approach to the analysis of the emergence or survival of buffer states. We analyze a two-stage game with three players orderly located on a linear territory, where the player in the middle is passive, and the players on the two ends are aggressive with options to declare war against the others. We conduct an equilibrium analysis and characterize the conditions under which the passive player acts as a buffer state between the aggressive players. We find various equilibrium outcomes, which can be grouped into the following categories: (i) peace with buffer, (ii) peace without buffer, and (iii) the last man standing. Our comparative static analyses reveal valuable insights regarding the factors affecting the existence of buffer states.
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