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| 1 |
ID:
183246
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| Summary/Abstract |
The weight of ideational factors has always been felt in Iran’s foreign policy processes as it, often times, outweighs that of material factors in its strategic calculus. Since 1979, the revolutionary state identity has focused on keeping the country independent and shaped its foreign policy continuum of enmity and amity accordingly. As the centrepiece of Iran’s foreign policy enactment and framing, independence brought ideational factors into Iran’s foreign policy processes. A close look into the past four decades suggests that strategic proportionality – based on the three principles of dignity, wisdom and expediency – vis-à-vis rivals and foes directed much of Iran’s foreign policy conduct, connecting ideational and material factors.
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| 2 |
ID:
178087
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| Summary/Abstract |
Iran's strategy with respect to Saudi Arabia is a key factor in the complex balance of power of the Middle East as the Iranian–Saudi rivalry impacts the dynamics of peace and conflict across the region from Yemen to Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Bahrain. What is Iranian strategic thinking on Saudi Arabia? And what have been the key factors driving the evolution of Iranian strategy towards the Kingdom? In what marks a substantive shift from its previous detente policy, we argue that Tehran has developed a new containment strategy in response to the perceived threat posed by an increasingly pro-active Saudi Arabia in the post-Arab Spring period. Incorporating rich fieldwork and interviews in the Middle East, this article delineates the theoretical contours of Iranian containment and contextualizes it within the framework of the Persian Gulf security architecture, demonstrating how rational geopolitical decision-making factors based on a containment strategy, rather than the primacy of sectarianism or domestic political orientations, shape Iran's Saudi strategy. Accordingly, the article traces Iranian strategic decision-making towards the Kingdom since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and examines three cases of Iran's current use of containment against Saudi Arabia in Syria, Yemen and Qatar.
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| 3 |
ID:
158021
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| Summary/Abstract |
Iran and Saudi Arabia appear fated to be rivals. Their controlled competition in the 1970s, organised around common threats, gave way to intense rivalry after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Over the ensuing four decades there have been ups and downs, but the constant feature has been competition. The 2011 Arab Spring added a new dimension to previous disputes, turning the traditional Iran–Saudi rivalry into a fierce regional confrontation.
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| 4 |
ID:
165042
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| Summary/Abstract |
Iran has been a critical player in the Syrian war since 2011, crafting a complex foreign policy and military strategy to preserve its Syrian ally. What have been the drivers of Iranian decision-making in this conflict? And how has Iranian strategy evolved over the course of the war? This article argues that the logic of deterrence has been fundamental not just for shaping the contours of Iran–Syria relations since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, but also for determining the overall trajectory of Iranian strategy in the Syrian war. The authors outline Iran's decision-making calculus and divide the country's strategy on Syria after the Arab Spring into four primary phases: 1) a ‘Basij’ strategy to establish local militias in Syria; 2) a regionalization strategy to incorporate transnational fighters and militias in the war effort; 3) an internationalization strategy to incorporate Russia and balance the United States; and 4) a post-ISIS deterrence strategy to balance against the United States, Turkey and Israel. Iran's Syria strategy progressively escalated in response to the possible defeat of its ally and the deterioration of its forward deterrence capacities against the United States and Israel. Today, the potential for direct inter-state conflict is rising as proxy warfare declines and Iran attempts to maintain the credibility of its forward deterrence.
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