| Summary/Abstract |
This article surveys the political economy of coups in Turkey, examining both their economic causes and the economic consequences they seem to generate. It reminds that whether coups had a negative causal effect on Turkish economic growth remains to be compellingly shown. It highlights that military intervention attempts tend to follow already troublesome economic times: Before the 1960 and 1980 coups, 1971 and 2007 memoranda, as well as the failed coup attempts in 1962 and 2016, economic growth slowed down compared to a previous five-year period. This is in line with global trends about coups becoming likely following slower economic growth. Furthermore, students of Turkish politics have noticed a more specific economic policy-making pattern centering on currency devaluation during episodes preceding coups. This article discusses whether such a pattern may be taken as a ‘local theory’ of Turkish coups while discussing its limitations.
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