| Summary/Abstract |
Why do international peace- and state-building interventions regularly fail to transform conflict-ridden countries into liberal states? This paper argues that interventionists’ practices and dependency on local intermediaries help explain the disappointing outcomes of intervention. Based on a relational theoretical approach and original empirical material, the paper compares two of the largest peace- and state-building interventions in recent years. For practical and normative reasons, peacebuilders need to find local partners who help them instil change. However, as partners of peace- and state-building interventions, local elites may appropriate international resources and use them to strengthen their own positions. Interventionists abstain from sanctioning such appropriation as long as their own short-term and purpose-oriented goals are not undermined. Contrary to assumptions in much of the literature, interventionists do not eagerly defend their alleged liberal agendas. Instead, their pragmatism strengthens existing neo-patrimonial figurations rather than fostering fundamental transformation. The paper argues that research should focus on peacebuilders’ actual practices rather than normative statements. Such an approach allows for a better understanding of evolving political orders in conflict societies.
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