|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
158383
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The ongoing redistribution of power on the international stage points to a more decentred international system featuring a multiplication of governance arrangements. A larger range of pivotal countries have the capacity and the confidence to pursue different priorities, a development that questions the prevalent post-Cold War expectation that the liberal international order would grow both wider and deeper. The central challenge for the future of the international order is managing diversity in ways that minimise conflict and leverage the benefits of interdependence. The evolution of regionalism and regional orders will be a critical dimension of the realignment of power, interests and normative agendas at the global level. Both more competition and more cooperation are likely to take place at the regional level, with the mix changing in different parts of the world. Provided that it is not merely a cover for coercive hegemonic aspirations and that it is designed to complement other levels of cooperation, regionalism can play an important role in preventing a more polycentric world from becoming a more fragmented and unstable one.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
158385
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Politicians, diplomats and analysts commonly assume that commitment to multilateralism and liberal norms is part of the EU’s very DNA. Increasingly, however, the EU’s commitment to the liberal global order is more selective. We demonstrate the shift to a more contingent liberalism by examining the EU’s recent record in relation to four different challenges: international trade; US leadership; Russian actions in the eastern neighbourhood; and security in the Middle East. We speculate on what this may portend for the EU’s self-identity, European interests and the integrity of the prevailing global order.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
158386
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
While much of the debate over the implications of China’s rise tends to dichotomise around either status quo or revisionist predictions, the reality seems to lie somewhere in between. In broad terms, China has embraced multilateral forms of cooperation and governance. This does not mean, however, that it is satisfied with the distribution of power in many international institutions, or some of the norms and principles that underpin them. This has resulted in a reformist position, with China increasingly willing to offer its own supplementary alternatives. China’s rise has also provided an important economic alternative to dealing with the West, and considerably undermined the ability of others to establish their preferences and world views. China’s lack of commitment to democracy and the external promotion of human rights remains a key reason why some analysts remain unconvinced about the long-term ambitions of an illiberal actor in a global liberal order.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
158388
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
After a period of significant gains, achieved largely through the establishment of institutions that promoted international liberalism, the global order today finds itself at a crucial juncture. Rising inequality, the proliferation of nationalist politics, technology-induced disruptions and the resurgence of zero-sum geopolitics, are all beginning to shake the foundations of the global governance architecture built assiduously over the past 70 years. It is clear that the liberal order, as it is frequently referred to, will not be able to sustain its influence in the 21st century unless it finds new torchbearers in Asia, where politics and economics are scripting a story very different from that of post-war Europe. To some, it is evident that India, which has successfully combined economic growth with its own liberal traditions, will indeed be the heir to and guarantor of this system as an emerging and leading power.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
158382
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The notion that we are experiencing a change in times whereby an old ‘order’ of the world is giving way to a new era has been gaining legitimacy in international debates among experts, policymakers and practitioners. Such debates are as animated as they are inconclusive in their outcomes. The contours of the upcoming era remain vague, its structure and contents undefined, its direction uncertain. Grim predictions of renewed great power competition as we have not seen since the end of the Cold War or even World War II or of an increasingly fragmented and ungovernable world abound. They co-exist though with less disheartening expectations of future global re-alignments eventually providing order. In the face of such divergent opinions, imagining the future at times looks like an act of divination.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
158389
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
While espoused by the newly independent states after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the liberal order has not taken root in interstate relations and is now openly contested in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. However, the challenges presented (primarily by Russia) to the international order also trigger growing contestation, in several Eastern European and South Caucasus countries, of an existing regional order premised on Russian hegemony. Therefore, the picture that emerges from these multiple contestations is not an alternative regional order, but rather overlapping orders in a fragmented region.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
158390
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Middle East has had a complex relationship with the so-called liberal international order. Many peoples and elites of the region welcomed the promise, and promises, of the liberal order after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and sought to integrate into it; for other peoples and elites, there have been negative reactions and resistance to it. Today, a majority of countries are integrated, at least nominally, into the global order, while some are decidedly still in systemic challenge with it. The Middle East has also had difficulty in cohering as a region; the condition today is one of collapsed regional order and proxy conflict.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
158391
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The United States/European-inspired liberal international order has long been challenged in the Asia-Pacific. During the Cold War years, Washington sponsored a developmental, state-interventionist order to contain the threat from Asian communism. This developmental order persisted even as the end of the Cold War allowed the US to promote a liberal regional order. Moreover, after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98, the US was increasing constrained by its post-9/11 preoccupation with the Middle East, the rise of China, its responsibility for the Great Recession of 2008-09 and the infighting that consumed Washington. While elements of a liberal order can be found in the Asia-Pacific today, they must continue to contend with non-interventionist and developmental values still found in the region.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
158384
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The election of Donald Trump in 2016 sent shock waves across political classes globally and prompted debates about whether his ‘America first’ agenda threatened the liberal international order. During his first year in office, Trump seemed determined to undermine the hallmarks of the liberal international order: democracy, liberal economics and international cooperation. So, are we witnessing the emergence of a “post-liberal” and “post-American” era? Four sources of evidence help frame – if not answer – the question: history, the crisis of liberal democracy, Trump’s world view, and the power of civil society (globally and nationally) to constrain any US President. They yield three main judgements. First, continuity often trumps change in US foreign policy. Second, the liberal international order may have been more fragile pre-Trump than was widely realised. Third, American power must be put at the service of its own democracy if the US is to become the example to the world it used to be.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
158387
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
A conventional opinion is that Russia is trying to destroy the liberal international order. Russia indeed defies it, but also justifies its foreign policy with the liberal order’s normative frameworks and reproaches the West for not standing up to these norms. Moreover, Moscow does not present any alternative vision. Russia complains about the internal contradictions of the liberal order: sovereignty vs. intervention, pluralism vs. universality, US hegemony vs. equality and democracy, although it also exploits these contradictions. In fact Russia demands an adjustment of the liberal order rather than its eradication and should, therefore, be classified as a neorevisionist power. Two elements underlie Russia’s at times aggressive foreign policy conduct. The first one, its feeling of being ill-accommodated in the present order, predefines the direction of the policy. The second, the prioritisation of foreign policy over domestic reforms, explains the intensity of Russian discontent and its occasional aggressive manifestations. Russia’s domestic consensus regarding its foreign policy, including views on the liberal international order, facilitates this aggressiveness. Three policy conclusions can be drawn: acknowledging that Russia uses the inherent contradictions of the liberal international order opens up possibilities for dialogue and an eventual overcoming of the crisis; the survival and strengthening of the liberal order depends on its embrace of all major players, including Russia, and hence, the need for some adjustments to the order itself; and finally such adjustments presuppose Russia’s readiness to shoulder responsibility for the (reformed) liberal international order.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|