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| 1 |
ID:
152070
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues for an updated strategy to limit the spread of sensitive nuclear technology around the globe. Traditional efforts by the United States to deny countries access to enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology are becoming difficult to enforce, while the threat of sanctions against US allies with legal nuclear-energy programs is not credible. As a result, the United States should shift toward a strategy of “buying out” an ally’s ambition for sensitive nuclear technology. Offering military, political, and economic assistance in exchange for stringent nonproliferation commitments will only work when offered at the earliest stage of technical development, before the country builds capabilities that will be difficult or expensive to give up. While there are some practical challenges to implementing such a strategy, the conditions are right to see if lucrative nuclear-energy offers—notably spent-waste management solutions—can induce countries with new civil nuclear programs to foreclose the option to develop ENR technology in the future.
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| 2 |
ID:
184873
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| 3 |
ID:
129104
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the debate over sanctions on Iran-their role in bringing Tehran to the negotiating table and their proper place in U.S. diplomatic strategy in the future-scant attention has been paid to a major shift in the negotiating position of the P5+1, the group of six countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) that is negotiating with Tehran over the Iranian nuclear program. No longer is the P5+1 demanding that Iran halt uranium enrichment. Indeed, in the November 24 first-step nuclear accord, the Joint Plan of Action,[1] the P5+1 all but concedes that Iran will be permitted to enrich in perpetuity. In separate comments that have quickly become conventional wisdom among Iran analysts, U.S. negotiators now characterize their previous position that Iran should halt enrichment as "maximalist."[2] Although undoubtedly expedient, this shift away from a zero-enrichment negotiating position is misguided and unnecessary.[3] The U.S. shift away from zero enrichment to limited enrichment represents a significant diplomatic victory for Iran. For the last decade, the position of the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the UK) and then the P5+1 had been that Iran must "suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development." This position was enshrined as an Iranian obligation in a series of UN Security Council resolutions.[4] Iran, however, asserted a "right to enrich" and refused to halt enrichment after resuming it when nuclear talks with the European Union broke down in 2005. This difference formed the core of the confrontation that subsequently developed between Iran and the allies.
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| 4 |
ID:
084021
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article presents an analytical model, originally developed in the 1980s, for the gas centrifuge and uses this methodology to determine the main design and operational characteristics of several hypothetical centrifuge designs. A series of simulations for a typical first-generation machine is used to assess the relevance of important breakout scenarios, including batch recycling and cascade interconnection, using either natural uranium or preenriched material as feedstock.
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| 5 |
ID:
123267
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Cambridge University Press India Pvt. Ltd., 2013.
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| Description |
xxv, 520p.
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| Standard Number |
9789382264620
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 057418 | 623.5119095491/KHA 057418 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
153898
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| Summary/Abstract |
Existing literature usually portrays Brazil as a country that set out to build nuclear weapons but ended up “rolling back” its original plans while keeping a nuclear “hedge” for an uncertain future, evidenced by Brazil's investment in uranium enrichment and its commitment to building a nuclear-powered submarine. This article draws on the historical record to offer a more nuanced view of Brazil's nuclear intentions as they evolved. It also focuses on the role of external pressure—mostly from Argentina and the United States—in shaping those motivations.
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| 7 |
ID:
142991
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| Summary/Abstract |
After months of optimistic statements from negotiators, the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) and Iran still have not achieved a comprehensive agreement to resolve the nuclear dispute. However, the interim Joint Plan of Action (JPA) is—at this writing—still in force and both sides maintain that a comprehensive deal remains within reach.
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| 8 |
ID:
105721
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The technical and political evidence that Iran is seeking to establish a 'nuclear hedging' capability has gradually increased over the past nine years. The regime in Tehran has continued to insist that its nuclear ambitions are purely civilian in nature and it has resisted the international community's dual-track policy, encompassing both negotiations and sanctions, to persuade Iran to be fully transparent about its nuclear activities and plans, and to suspend work related to uranium enrichment and plutonium separation. While the prospects for a negotiated solution currently appear slim, the regime does not yet appear to have decided whether, or when, to produce nuclear weapons and to break out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is essential, therefore, to maintain and if necessary to build up the pressure on Iran and to strengthen efforts to disrupt its procurement of technology and materials for its nuclear programme. It is also imperative for the international community to maintain negotiations and also consider alternative diplomatic approaches to enhance the prospects of keeping Iran focused purely on civil nuclear ambitions, while at the same time resolving questions related to the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme.
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| 9 |
ID:
074014
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| 10 |
ID:
076715
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Tipped off by Iran's efforts to acquire uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, despite the economic illogic, the United States and its allies identified Tehran's nuclear weapons intentions early on and took effective action to stop several countries from inadvertently assisting that program. This postponed the worst-case scenario of when Iran might have the bomb, which for 15 years has been estimated at being five to ten years away. The intelligence success gave insufficient attention, however, to Iran's procurement efforts through non-state actors on the black market. Intelligence on Iran's motivations also will be important to devising effective policies. Those motivations include a need to achieve prestige, assert national pride, and secure dominance in the Gulf region. Iran's clerical leaders also see a nuclear capability as the best way to ensure their survival despite outside threats and internal opposition. At least 10 indicators of military involvement in the program have become known, reinforcing the judgment that Tehran is still intent on developing a latent nuclear weapons capability. Despite the confirmed evidence, the international community has not been able to change Iran's strategic calculations. The intelligence indicators will need to be corroborated if the world is to summon the will to put firm pressure on Iran to stop its nuclear pursuits.
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| 11 |
ID:
092916
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Four firms dominate the international uranium enrichment market. Simultaneously, the nations that host enrichment facilities strongly discourage other nations from developing enrichment capacity, given its potential use in nuclear weapons production. Therefore, these four firms benefit from the exercise of national power to prevent entry into this market. This paper shows that these firms also benefit from increasing returns to scale. In similar national situations, this industry would be regulated or nationalized. This is because free markets do not necessarily lead to a socially optimal long-run equilibrium where the industry is necessarily concentrated, such that there is no proliferating entry, but is sufficiently diverse, so that no one national group can dictate prices, contract terms, or non-proliferation policy. Therefore, some form of international regulation might be necessary to discourage enrichment technology proliferation and assure enrichment supply at reasonable prices.
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| 12 |
ID:
123691
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
AbstractSouth Africa was one of the first states to conclude an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2002, allowing the IAEA greater right of access to safeguard nuclear activities and material. In light of this, some observers in the arms control community find it odd that South Africa's representatives at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) would be the main objectors to making the conclusion of an Additional Protocol a precondition for states wishing to import uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology (classified as sensitive nuclear technology and material). The South African objection should be viewed as only the most recent in a series of objections to measures that may seem obviously in line with nuclear non-proliferation. This emerging pattern in South Africa's nuclear diplomacy and, more specifically, the objection to the Additional Protocol condition are related to its membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and can be investigated through the lens of a politics of denial. Denial is the act of saying "no", but it is also in psychological parlance the unconscious thought process manifesting a refusal to acknowledge the existence of certain unpleasant aspects of external reality. It will be argued that South Africa's opposition to the Additional Protocol condition can be explained in the context of two instances of denial: (i) a perceived denial by the nuclear haves of what the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty codifies as an inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology - something that South Africa is cautious to be complicit in; and (ii) the nuclear weapon states' denial (the psychological meaning) of the unpleasant reality of a hypocritical nuclear order - something that South Africa wants to expose or at least something with which to engage to limit the effects for itself and other NAM members. The politics of denial does not yield to a pragmatist/utopian dichotomy in the nuclear realm, but instead reveals the dialectic nature of realism and idealism in nuclear politics, especially as reflected in South Africa's nuclear diplomacy.
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| 13 |
ID:
091897
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Global nuclear energy production is projected to triple over the next 50 years, raising concerns about the risk of proliferation. Pavel Podvig explores the security challenges associated with nuclear power and considers options for regulating the industry.
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| 14 |
ID:
105055
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The recent devastating tsunami that hit Japan and the subsequent tragedy at a Japanese nuclear power plant has once again demonstrated the vulnerability of the nuclear power industry. The industry's long-term future (there are no alternatives in the short and mid-term) depends largely on whether the major nuclear countries can agree to coordinate their efforts for the nuclear power industry and emerge from this crisis stronger and safer than it was before the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant. The preservation of the nuclear power industry requires broader international cooperation in the nuclear field.
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| 15 |
ID:
142269
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the current capability of accelerator technology, which is rapidly improving, to produce medical isotopes. A detailed analysis of 12 medical isotopes that are in active diagnostic and therapeutic use and typically made in nuclear reactors shows that accelerator-based technologies, such as linear accelerators, cyclotrons, and spallation neutron sources, could meet medical demand for these isotopes, without the use of enriched uranium and with low proliferation risk. The feasibility of accelerator-based production of an additional 70 isotopes that have a potential medical use is also discussed.
A simple estimate suggests that accelerators can produce isotopes at a cost comparable to reactors. This article includes four case studies that illustrate the recent choices that emerging market countries have made when expanding domestic medical isotope production. Technical, commercial, and regulatory steps for commercialization are also described. The article concludes with policy suggestions that would increase the adoption of accelerator-based medical isotope production.
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| 16 |
ID:
091889
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The revelation of Iran's nuclear facility has significantly heightended concerns about the regime's nuclear ambitions. Using satellite imagery, Jane's explores the features of the site and considers Iran's nucler capabilities and intentions in light of the disclosur.
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| 17 |
ID:
171569
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| 18 |
ID:
074651
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| Publication |
Springfield, U.S Department of Commerce, 1995.
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| Description |
x, 100p.
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| Series |
INEL; no.95/0322
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 040233 | 355.825119/STO 040233 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 19 |
ID:
191980
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the early 2000s, the George W. Bush administration condemned Iran’s use of nuclear-fuel-cycle technologies while endorsing sensitive nuclear activities in South Korea. The politics behind this difference may appear self-evident, but maintaining this policy was premised on a complex interaction between technology and politics. This paper examines both US and international definitions of uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing and finds an incoherence between technical definitions and policy implementation. Definitions of enrichment are narrow, as they refer to a very specific set of material processes. But the Bush administration applied a capacious standard when debating what it meant for Iran to “suspend” enrichment-related activities. On the other hand, definitions of reprocessing are capacious, implicating many different processes that can be interpreted as reprocessing. And yet the Bush administration applied a narrow standard as it sought to assist South Korea’s pyroprocessing efforts. By positing a reciprocal relationship between technology and politics, this article challenges both the position that technical solutions can solve entrenched political conflicts, and also the simplified narrative that great-power politics trumps shared technical and legal standards. Interpretive conflicts over technical standards are shaped by politics, and yet technical contestation also limits and bounds political manipulation.
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| 20 |
ID:
086636
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States, Israel, and several European allies have explicitly stated that they will not accept the possession of nuclear weapons by the Islamic fundamentalist regime ruling Iran. Iran has defied several UN Security Council resolutions and continued its uranium enrichment. On December 3, 2007, the U.S. released the November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran. If the NIE assessment that Iran could develop nuclear weapons sometimes between 2010 and 2015 is correct, the new American president has twelve options available in dealing with Iran. This study analyzes potential consequences, shortcomings, costs, and benefits of each option.
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