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ID: 161060

Social policy and political trust: evidence from the new rural pension scheme in China / Li, Zhonglu; Wu, Xiaogang

Wu, Xiaogang	Journal Article
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This article analyses the data from the 2010 Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) to investigate the effects of the New Rural Pension Scheme (NRPS) on people's political trust and policy expectations in China. Results from difference-in-differences (DID) analyses show that those in the NRPS pilot areas reported higher levels of trust in government at both central and local levels than their counterparts in non-NRPS areas, with the former gaining more support than the latter. Moreover, the potential NRPS beneficiaries show similarly higher levels of trust in both central and local governments than non-NRPS beneficiaries. However, the policy did not increase rural residents’ rights consciousness that the government should take the main responsibility for the provision of the old-age support. These findings suggest that citizens' political trust under an authoritarian regime is mainly determined by the material benefits they receive.

Key Words

China ; Political Trust ; Social Policy - China ; Policy Benefits ; New Rural Pension Scheme - China ; NRPS ;
Policy Expectations ; Chinese General Social Survey

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ID: 158696

Voters get what they want (when they pay attention): human rights, policy benefits, and foreign aid / Heinrich, Tobias ; Long, Leah ; Kobayashi, Yoshiharu

Heinrich, Tobias	Journal Article
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How do the human rights practices abroad affect decisions about the allocation of foreign aid? This article provides a new approach to this long-standing question. We bring donor government, donor citizens, and recipients’ attributes together in a single analytical framework. We argue that donor citizens are more self-serving than previously assumed; they do not wholeheartedly support their government punishing human rights abusers when those states provide important policy benefits. When donor governments believe that their citizens will hold them accountable for their policy choices, they make foreign aid decisions that mirror citizens’ self-serving policy preferences. Thus, they avoid punishing repressive regimes that are the sources of valuable benefits. Our experimental and observational results provide support for our claims. Overall, our findings suggest that aid donors selectively punish human rights violators with aid cuts, but their variegated treatment of human rights violators largely stems from the self-serving policy preferences of their voters.

Key Words

Human Rights ; Foreign Aid ; Voters ; Policy Benefits

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