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ID: 165319

Embedded deception: interpersonal trust, cooperative expectations, and the sharing of fabricated intelligence / Brown, Jonathan N ; Farrington, Alex ; Lupton, Danielle L

Brown, Jonathan N	Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract

When and why do friendly states deliberately share and unwittingly accept fabricated intelligence about others? Recent work on the interpersonal foundations of security cooperation suggests intelligence liaison is a type of embedded relationship that requires a dependable route for exchange (close personal ties) and a consistent record of exchange (reliably meeting expectations). We extend this argument to show that the relational embeddedness underpinning truthful intelligence liaison also explains the sharing of fabricated intelligence. We argue that intimate personal relations and a history of reliable exchange create a channel for effectively transmitting false information, for the recipient is unlikely to challenge its authenticity, and that violated cooperative expectations provide a reason for attempting to deceive a partner. Drawing on extensive archival research, we evaluate our theory by analyzing Britain's decision to share fabricated intelligence about Germany with the United States in 1941.

Key Words

Deception ; Trust ; Embeddedness ; Intelligence Sharing ; Lying

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ID: 158994

Reexamining reputation for resolve: leaders, states, and the onset of international crises / Lupton, Danielle L

Lupton, Danielle L	Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract

Scholars remain conflicted over the effects of reputations for resolve on international conflict and which actors acquire these reputations. I address this debate by examining how our measures of resolve, as well as where we look for its effects, influence our conclusions about its impact on international conflict. Using data from the Archigos dataset and the International Crisis Behavior dataset, I perform a semi-parametric Cox survival analysis and directly compare the effects of resolute and irresolute behavior at two distinct levels of analysis: the leader level of analysis and the state level of analysis. My results show that target leaders who employ relatively more violent or more severe major responses to dispute triggers enjoy significantly longer periods of time before being the target of a future dispute initiated by the same challenger leader. While I also find a similar effect for target states that employ relatively more severe responses, the impact of resolute behavior at the state level of analysis does not appear to be as consistently widespread as that of resolute behavior at the leader level of analysis. My findings also show that how scholars choose to measure resolve as a concept can have important implications for their conclusions about its broader effects. Finally, my analyses present evidence that both leaders and states may be capable of acquiring reputations for resolve, opening up interesting avenues of future research.

Key Words

Leaders ; Reputation ; Resolve ; Crisis Escalation ; Conflict Initiation

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