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| 1 |
ID:
161351
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nuclear assets are one of the cornerstones of credible collective deterrence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Paradoxically, the most endangered member states are the ones without nuclear capabilities, left with the hope and expectation that the owners of nuclear assets will defend them and that their potential enemies are deterred by these capabilities. However, the expectations from one side, practical commitment of allies from other side may not go in harmony and synchronisation. Is there a capability gap which needs to be fulfilled? If yes then, is the gap in the side of nuclear powers or is it on the side of those endangered states who need to understand what can or cannot realistically be expected? The current article focuses on the question of how the political and military elite of the Baltic states describes their expectations in terms of using Alliance's nuclear capabilities to deter Russia's regional ambitions.
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| 2 |
ID:
170276
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| Summary/Abstract |
The aim of the current study is to discuss which particular factors Russia considers as sufficient deterrent capabilities and whether the national defence models implemented in the Baltic countries have the potential to deter Russia's military planners and political leadership. Whilst the existing conventional reserves of NATO are sizeable, secure, and rapid, deployment is still a critical variable in case of a conflict in the Baltic countries because of the limited range of safe transportation options. However, whilst the Baltic States are developing their capabilities according to the priorities defined by NATO in 2010; which were updated after the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian military planners have meanwhile redesigned both their military doctrine and military forces, learning from the experience of the Russo-Georgian war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and other recent confrontations. Accordingly, there is a risk that the efforts of the Baltic countries could prove rather inefficient in deterring Russia.
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| 3 |
ID:
175691
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The Defender 2020 military exercise and its related deployments look fairly reasonable and rational from the perspective of the Baltic States and NATO, but when theoretically analyzing its options left, the Russian political leadership could react severely or enact a series of policies from such an initial “provocation”. More importantly, Russia could perceive that the Baltic Sea Region is being transformed into a potential area for confrontation from which also they could benefit from additional escalation. In the broadest sense, the article tries to both clarify and join the intentions of NATO and the reaction of Russia.
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| 4 |
ID:
159192
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| Summary/Abstract |
According to the NATO’s collective defence strategy and the principle of deterrence, “no one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened”. In this sense, credible deterrence acts as a guarantee for peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. However, recent events in Ukraine and Georgia have revealed the potential weaknesses of the current deterrence models. Without any overt fear of retaliation, we have seen Russia’s aggressive steps towards its neighbours, which were planned and executed with great sophistication, initiative, agility and decisiveness. Although contrary to Ukraine and Georgia which are not the members of the Alliance, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are granted security guarantees in the NATO framework, the Baltic countries clearly constitute Russia’s point of contact with NATO and are, therefore, also subject to the interests of Russia to test mutual capabilities and commitment, and to send strategic messages to the Alliance. In this context, the article aims to assess how credible is the deterrence posture provided by NATO in avoiding potential aggression on the part of Russia against the Baltic countries.
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| 5 |
ID:
175643
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes the impact of targeted sanctions (also known as smart sanctions) that Western countries have imposed on Russia due to the Ukrainian conflict by examining the linkages between Russia’s modernization plans for its military equipment, the country’s actual achievements, and the circumstances impeding the execution of Russia’s ambitious ideas. The study focuses on three military innovations currently in development, the T-14 Armata tank together with the Armata universal combat platform, the Su-57 fighter jet, and the new LHD amphibious assault ship. Several other studies have previously described the knowledge-based and technology-based limitations that Russia faces in realizing its ambitions. This article confirms these findings. However, it also broadens the scope of the discussion by focusing on the question whether this Western embargo on the export of military technology, goods, and materials to Russia could lead Russia to a more peaceful or more aggressive road in the future.
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| 6 |
ID:
193518
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| Summary/Abstract |
To choose an effective strategy to stop Putin and Russia’s aggressive ambitions in Ukraine and in wider Eastern Europe, Western political and military leaders need to understand his modus operandi and strategic logic. This article focuses on the benefits of game theory in explaining the behavior of the warring parties in Ukraine. It argues that, from an initial “mad man” or a game of chicken strategy chosen by Putin, he has been forced to gradually shift toward a less promising dollar auction model. If the mad man strategy was meant to deter opposing powers from testing Putin’s limits, now the dominant game has locked Putin into a self-driven game with ever higher bids and complications for any exit. For an effective response from the West, the key elements are the Ukrainian will to fight but also the brinkmanship of the West in choosing the right moment to force the Kremlin out of the game.
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| 7 |
ID:
182024
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| Summary/Abstract |
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the Russian Federation have invested their energy in convincing the opposing side about the legitimacy, importance, and even supremacy of their international political narratives. While the West is committed to value based international order, economic and political sanctions, and credible deterrence, Russia is pushing for a concept of a Eurasian center of power, a multipolar world order, and the importance of the Raison d’ État. These two energetic monologues, however, have provided little dialogue or actual results in terms of cooperation or de-escalation. Can these competing concepts be simultaneously successful at all, or does one side need to fundamentally redesign its conceptual principles?
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| 8 |
ID:
170447
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russian escalation activities related to the Suwalki corridor and wider Baltic security make a good case for demonstrating how theoretical models could help in terms of damage control in complicated security situations. This is especially true regarding how seemingly rational and morally impeccable options may eventually lead to a painful and costly security dilemma in which the available options become both too costly and publicly unacceptable. In order to grasp the inner workings of the “escalate-to-de-escalate” brinkmanship, the current study analyzes this phenomenon through the lens of the game theory model, “dollar auction,” and a concept of securitization. The aim of the study is to analyze which factors either hinder or support the escalation of tensions between Russia and the NATO Alliance in Kaliningrad and in the Suwalki corridor, and to discuss how far the potential conflict could go should it break out in the future.
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