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| 1 |
ID:
158040
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the political experience and mental journey of four Western-educated Chinese intellectuals in the Mao era: art critic and translator Fu Lei; architect Liang Sicheng; historian Zhou Yiliang; and rocket scientist Qian Xuesen. It shows that though initially politically unaffiliated, all four were rapidly drawn towards the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), identified with the Party norms and lent support to the state. Such development can be attributed to their serious deliberation on ideological, social and personal issues, and the Party’s co-optation strategies. They were either eventually victimized in Maoist campaigns, or took advantage of political winds for personal advancement, or shrewdly carved out a professional space by virtue of political correctness. Their stories shed important light on the complex pattern of thinking and behavior of Chinese intellectuals, and the dynamism of the CCP in its early rule.
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| 2 |
ID:
158035
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| Summary/Abstract |
Quasi-mediation diplomacy’ refers to the role a ‘mediating’ state plays in international activities to defend its commercial, political and diplomatic interests rather than core security and strategic interests. This type of mediator acts without seeking to dominate; to follow rather than to lead; to partake in the revision of the agenda rather than setting it; and, to encourage conflict de-escalation in lieu of determinedly engaging in conflict resolution. The dynamics of China’s quasi-mediation diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) depend on their relevance to China’s vital commercial interests, the scope of China’s influence, the level of the great powers’ consensus and the intractability of crisis settlement. Through a comprehensive interchange of the above-mentioned variables, China-styled quasi-mediation diplomacy rests on risk-aversion, revealing divergent forms which can be categorized at four levels, namely, multifaceted intervention, proactive involvement, limited intercession and indirect participation. These four categories of China’s quasi-mediation diplomacy shed light on China’s discreet participation in the MENA conflict resolutions.
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| 3 |
ID:
158039
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This article argues that dominant political thinking during the Cultural Revolution supported antagonistic and fallacious logic, dictatorial, dehumanizing and violent thoughts and behavior in the service of purism and a fundamentalist ideology. It traces these views back to the Party’s earlier history and to human history in general. Using Pingzhou county, Shanxi province, as an example, the article focuses on the development of these attitudes during the land reform campaign of the 1940s, and their culmination in the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s. The evidence is based on local archival and interview data regarding these two events. Understanding the origin and development of Cultural Revolution thinking has important implications for understanding events in China today.
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| 4 |
ID:
158032
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| Summary/Abstract |
Chinese governments, driven by both pragmatic and legitimacy purposes, have been enthusiastically engaging social organizations in service contracting to meet rising service demands. This article argues that social organizations’ participation in contracting is shaped by their dual identity as state agents and social actors. Such a dual identity is forged by China’s institutional environment and its internal tension may create both incentives and disincentives for contracting. Using the data from the competitive contracting for the social service program in Shanghai (2009–2013), the article finds intriguing evidence that both identities had positive influences on social organizations’ participation. Social organizations actively participated to demonstrate loyalty and manage their relations with government, as well as to seek new resources, social visibility and professional capacities. They reconciled the two identities by adopting multiple strategies. Further analysis reveals how contracting has been adapted to the social-administrative system in China.
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| 5 |
ID:
158037
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article addresses the challenges of understanding, measuring and explaining political identities in post-1997 Hong Kong. It shows that national and local identities are better conceptualized as two distinct attitudes and captured with separate scaled items than as opposite poles of one attitude measured in a single categorical item. This approach reveals that the key shift occurred not in local identity, but in nationalistic sentiments, which have initially increased but have been on a downward trend since 2008. It also shows that national and local identities were perceived as robustly compatible for most years since 1997, but have begun to drift apart in recent years. Considering competing accounts to explain national identity strength, trust in the central government stands out as the dominant factor. Discontent with livelihood conditions and socio-structural variables either have no significant effect or are to a large part the result of differences in political trust.
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| 6 |
ID:
158031
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the role of participatory governance innovations in China. The purpose is twofold. First, it seeks to explore the logic and dynamics behind participatory innovations in China. Second, it examines in what way a participatory innovation in Hangzhou can lead to increased accountability and responsiveness of the local government. Participatory innovations in China are used as a way to improve the Party-state’s governing capability and thereby strengthen the legitimacy and power of the Communist Party. Despite some limitations related to the evaluation of politically powerful Party and government departments, social assessment of government performance in Hangzhou serves as an input channel from society that put pressure on many government departments. The study finds that by allowing limited and controlled political participation, transparency and accountability to develop, the reform in Hangzhou improves the responsiveness of the political system.
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| 7 |
ID:
158034
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| Summary/Abstract |
The economies of Africa require urgent structural transformation and the great challenge is how industrial development can aid this transformation process. China’s ability to sustain high productivity growth was underpinned by resource allocation from low-to-high productive sectors and this was the essence of its own modernization processes. Most African countries remain highly reliant on commodity exports in a depressed global environment, exacerbated by declining demand from China as the continent’s major trading partner. This article examines the dilemmas of Africa’s reliance on commodity exports but, equally importantly, it seeks to investigate how China, based on its own experience, could contribute to assisting African countries to move up value chains via the imperative of a concerted industrialization endeavour and the commitments China has made in this regard. This article suggests an incremental approach that emphasizes the importance of institution building as the optimal route for promoting Africa’s development on a sustained basis.
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| 8 |
ID:
158033
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| Summary/Abstract |
Based on a questionnaire survey in five counties of Ya’an Municipality in south-western China, the study reveals a fairly high level of political trust among citizens. The study also confirms the disparate trust in different levels of government known from other studies, i.e. that political trust in the central government is higher than political trust in local governments. The contribution of this research is a fine-grained investigation into the sources of local political trust in the municipality under scrutiny. More precisely, the analysis shows that political trust in local governments is associated with both cultural factors and perceptions of the quality of local government. Particularly, political trust in local governments is strongly influenced by the perception that these governments perform well, are responsive to citizens’ needs, and are free from corruption.
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| 9 |
ID:
158038
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why has vote buying spread so rapidly in China’s village elections in recent years? Based on fieldwork conducted in 14 villages of Shandong Province, this article argues that candidates pursue vote buying when they perceive large potential economic rents associated with the village leader’s power. While such rents were relatively limited in the past, the introduction of land takings in rural areas has significantly changed this situation and sharply increased potential rents for candidates, thus providing them with stronger incentives to pursue vote buying. In other words, this article associates vote buying with rent seeking in China’s village elections.
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| 10 |
ID:
158036
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) needs to recruit and incentivize two categories of grassroots party workers, namely, grassroots party secretaries and full-time party workers, to take on party work for the non-public sector of the economy. Three general strategies of recruitment have been developed: adaptation, reactivation and cooptation. Using these strategies, the CCP sets in motion the flow of human resources between the public and the non-public sectors. The CCP provides three general incentives to its grassroots party workers: material incentives, status incentives and the incentives of identity. Full-time party workers are careerists who ‘live off’ the Party and expect material incentives, while part-time grassroots party secretaries are believers who ‘live for’ the Party and expect status incentives and the incentives of identity.
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