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1 |
ID:
159999
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Summary/Abstract |
It is over a year since the collapse of the devolved administration at Stormont, which left one region of the United Kingdom without a functioning executive. Reluctance to introduce direct rule from Westminster reduced Northern Ireland to a desiccated form of governance. This article examines the nature and form of government in this political vacuum. The consequences of this system are examined in terms of the absence of legislation, mechanisms for scrutiny, and participation in intergovernmental relations. In the absence of devolution and direct rule, the potential for greater involvement of the Irish government in the affairs of Northern Ireland is also considered.
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2 |
ID:
159986
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Summary/Abstract |
This article analyses the role that British conservative tabloid newspapers play in promoting penal populism and delegitimising liberal prison reform initiatives. Principally, we consider how different sections of the British press reacted to the then Prime Minister David Cameron's prison reform speech of 8 February 2016. The analysis illustrates how different newspapers cohered around two diametrically opposing interpretations of the scandalous state of the prison system, reflecting distinctive penal philosophies and moral positions. In the context of penal populism and the populist furies unleashed by the Brexit campaign, the central research finding is that the comparatively passive and equivocal support offered by the broadsheets was no match for the vitriolic attack mounted by the conservative tabloids on the ‘soft justice’ parts of Cameron's prison reform agenda. We conclude by arguing that the stark lesson to be learned is that the scandal‐ridden prison is a particularly toxic issue marked by serial policy failure. Consequently, in a febrile, intermediatised penal populist context, why would any political leader take on the manifest risks associated with embarking on liberal prison reform?
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3 |
ID:
159998
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Summary/Abstract |
It is becoming increasingly accepted, not least by the Prime Minister and opposition leadership, that the negotiation of a comprehensive trade relationship with the EU is necessary to prevent the UK economy falling off a ‘cliff edge’. This concern is shaping the UK's strategy towards negotiations with the EU and has provided at least part of the motivation for the UK to consider requesting a transition period to facilitate the Brexit process. But how accurate are these fears? What evidence is there for the existence of a ‘cliff edge’? How disastrous would it be for the UK to revert to trading with the EU on the same basis as most other countries in the world, namely according to World Trade Organisation rules? This article seeks to address these issues and it highlights a number of implications for policy makers which flow from understanding the available evidence a little more clearly.
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4 |
ID:
159981
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5 |
ID:
159993
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Summary/Abstract |
This article develops the position we have taken in debate with Anthony Atkinson that a participation income (PI) would be problematic from an administrative and political point of view. We argue that Atkinson remains far too optimistic about the magnitude of administrative difficulties a PI would face. Negotiating these difficulties will inevitably involve the sort of political trade‐offs PI is supposedly able to avoid when compared to its more controversial cousin, the unconditional basic income. The enduring significance of ‘The case for a participation income’, we argue, lies in the often neglected point that Atkinson intends a PI as a supplement to an eroding contribution‐based welfare state. In the current political and fiscal environment, the case for a universal support scheme set below the rate of subsistence, and supplemented by other forms of welfare support, deserves careful re‐examination.
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6 |
ID:
159992
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Summary/Abstract |
Anthony Atkinson's idea of a participation income draws attention to the various ways in which people contribute to society. Current discussions on social participation go beyond paid work to include volunteering, education, and caregiving to kin. With the idea of the participation income, various forms of contribution can be highlighted and acknowledged. This article investigates how the idea of a participation income is reflected in Danish, Finnish, German and Dutch social policies. It shows that different elements of a participation income are incorporated in active labour market policies: Denmark adopted a narrow focus on paid work; Finland seeks tailor‐made solutions for the long‐term unemployed; Germany reformed many policy areas to achieve a better activation; and the Netherlands acknowledges a wide range of social participation forms. These country differences highlight that governments can adapt the idea of a participation income to achieve the focus they desire.
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7 |
ID:
159987
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Summary/Abstract |
creation a decade ago. The committee has, from the outset, overseen many contentious policy and legislative developments in the penal field, although none so extensive as those introduced following the formation of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2010. Despite the newsworthy nature of its business, the committee has, to some extent, operated in the shadows of its high‐profile sister, the Home Affairs Select Committee, and has received surprisingly limited attention from criminologists and political scientists alike. Forming part of a wider investigation into the work of the committee, this article examines the extent to which it was able to influence penal developments during the coalition years. This period is of particular interest given that it heralded the end of the New Labour administration and welcomed the ‘fresh thinking’ of a coalition leadership keen to emphasise its progressive attitude towards law and order. While the committee was able to influence the direction of penal policy on several occasions, this mostly occurred as a result of its proactive or niche inquiries. The committee had less impact when conducting inquiries that assessed the government's flagship policy agenda, however. Such findings brought into question the ability of the committee to influence the most significant justice transformations in this era of new penal governance.
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8 |
ID:
159983
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Summary/Abstract |
This paper discusses trends in criminal justice and penal policy over the past twenty‐five years. This period has been characterised as a time of penal populism, which originated in the failure of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act, and the competition between the main political parties to be ‘tough on crime’. However, this is not the only trend to be found in penal policy. There has continued to be a strong undertow of support for rehabilitation and community penalties, including restorative justice. There has been pressure from the left as much as the right to take domestic violence, sexual offences against women and children, and hate crimes more seriously. There have been pressures to meet performance targets—which gradually transformed into calls to build the legitimacy of the justice system. Finally, there have been pressures to privatise criminal justice agencies. These various impulses have sometimes amplified and sometimes counteracted the pressures towards tough penal policy. If the period of intense penal populism ran from 1993 to 2007, inertia in the system has ensured that there have been no significant attempts to row back from tough policies, and to reassert the values of penal parsimony. Given that money has been tight since 2007 and crime has continued to fall, this must amount to a lost opportunity of significant proportions.
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9 |
ID:
159989
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Summary/Abstract |
The public significance of the victim has shifted over successive governments. Each party, when in power, has utilised and politicised the victim to support its policy and legislative agenda. However, on the whole, this attention has been reserved for those who are victims of serious crime (such as murder, sexual violence and domestic abuse) and not volume offences (such as burglary, criminal damage, theft). Recent years have seen the inquiry rising in popularity, a ‘quick political fix’ to satisfy victims—and the public—that action on societal ills is being taken. However, in so doing, successive governments have, perhaps inadvertently, tended to replicate the ‘hierarchy of victimisation’ that is witnessed in frontline criminal justice activities. This has the result of affording victims only a spectator role when policy and legislative changes are being developed in their name. By contrast, the actions taken in developing expert and practitioner‐led policy around victim experience have proved to be more ‘successful’ in generating lasting change. This article suggests that there is no single ‘right’ approach to involving victims in policy development, but that each particular incident or situation needs consideration as how most ‘effectively’ to involve first‐hand victim experience.
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10 |
ID:
159994
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Summary/Abstract |
In this article, I argue that a participatory income (PI)—the proposal originally presented by Anthony Atkinson in 1996—can potentially perform better than an unconditional basic income (UBI) in terms of addressing unmet social needs. I explain why we should expect that unmet social needs can be better alleviated by the recipients of a PI rather than by the voluntary actions of UBI recipients. In particular, the argument presented here seeks to develop a particularly forgotten point in the PI debate—namely, the importance of using income transfer programmes as a policy tool to motivate people to engage in socially valuable activities.
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11 |
ID:
159982
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12 |
ID:
159984
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Summary/Abstract |
This article draws on some findings from research which investigated penal voluntary sector adaptation to the mixed market in criminal justice services. The article firstly reprises the main trends for aligning state relationships with the voluntary sector from the 1980s to the present. We then outline some findings about adaptive experiences, situations and practices of the voluntary sector in criminal justice resettlement in the light of considerable upheaval. The research found that service providing voluntary sector organisations (VSOs) either outwardly comply with, or, in a minority of cases, actively embrace, competitive marketised models of service delivery. Secondly, the sector has normalised commercial approaches to organisational efficiency as well as aligned with bureaucratic practices common to the statutory sector. Despite charges that they are effectively co‐opted by both state and market interests, many have reported conflicts between prioritising long‐term financial viability with their founding ‘ethos and values’. We conclude that while many VSOs have successfully adjusted to market and bureaucratic norms, aspects of that repositioning have been at a cost to their traditions of relative autonomy, localism and distinctiveness, to the possible detriment of a vigorous civil society.
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13 |
ID:
159996
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Summary/Abstract |
The political discourse is characterised by two opposing ideals of hard and soft Brexit. In this article, we present evidence of attitudinal types that map neatly onto these archetypal views. The hard Brexit view is defined by issues that eurosceptics prioritise, most prominently sovereignty. By contrast, europhiles prioritise cooperation with Europe in terms of scientific collaboration and market access. However, attitudinal types are not either/or in the minds of the British public, and many prioritise all or none of the issues. Further, the two opposing positions together account for 37 per cent of the public's view. That is, just over one‐third differentiate between the salient issues in ways congruent with political ideals. National identity plays a particular role in the sociodemographic profiles of these attitude types. Older people have a strong stance in any direction (sovereignty, cooperation, or both), but national identity is linked to differentiated positions (sovereignty only or cooperation only).
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14 |
ID:
159991
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Summary/Abstract |
This article introduces the published proceedings of a symposium into Anthony Atkinson's proposal for a participation income. Just one of his many intellectual contributions, Atkinson famously argued for a scheme that gave up on the ambition of an unconditional scheme in order to press the case for a universal and non‐means tested income support scheme. The 'participation requirement' was a response to criticisms of basic income based on the absence of reciprocity. The contributions represent a range of responses and includes critics of participation income as well as those who are sympathetic to the goal of a participation income. All of them demonstrate the continuing relevance of Atkinson's proposal to ongoing debates on the reform of the welfare state.
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15 |
ID:
159985
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Summary/Abstract |
This article explores some of the key pathologies of English penal politics by applying an interpretive political analysis perspective to the specific issue of the plight of the ‘prisoners left behind’, the thousands of indeterminate‐sentenced IPP (imprisonment for public protection) prisoners who remain incarcerated, notwithstanding the abolition in 2012 of this sentencing option targeted at ‘dangerous offenders’. The article draws on research findings from an ESRC funded study of penal policymaking to examine why the Gordian knot of the prisoners left behind has proved to be so hard to untangle. The broader lessons of this specific story are then set out. In particular, it is argued that the public and political debate around criminal justice has become damagingly narrow over recent years.
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16 |
ID:
159997
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Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the potential implications of the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union (so‐called ‘Brexit’) for the success and survival of the country's flagship climate policy, the Climate Change Act 2008. The impact of a ‘soft’ and a ‘hard’ Brexit for the main features of the Climate Change Act are assessed, building on documentary evidence and elite interviews with key policy‐makers and policy‐shapers. The article argues that the long‐term viability of the Climate Change Act was being threatened even before the EU referendum, and that Brexit will do little to improve this situation. Even though the existence of the Climate Change Act is not under immediate threat, a range of issues presented by Brexit risk undermining its successful implementation.
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17 |
ID:
159990
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Summary/Abstract |
The government is currently implementing an ambitious agenda of reforms to transform the justice system of England and Wales. The stated aim is to improve efficiency, primarily by utilising technology and bringing processes online where possible. The speed and ambition of the programme has led to concerns that the drive for efficiency is coming at the expense of ensuring a fair and effective justice system. This article suggests that the fundamental principles underpinning our justice system are at risk of being lost in the push for increased efficiency. It focuses on two specific proposals: increasing the use of video links, thus moving to virtual hearings as the default position for the majority of cases; and of automating the conviction process in certain criminal cases. It is argued that both proposals undermine the role of an independent judiciary in making fair and transparent decisions.
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18 |
ID:
159988
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Summary/Abstract |
Since publication of the Corston Report in 2007, initiatives with regard to women and criminal justice in England and Wales have been marked by positive steps on the one hand, but reversal and failure on the other. A central element to this narrative has been the enthusiastic development of community‐based services for women, only to be followed by the subsequent dissipation of government energy, a diminution of interest, and a decline in funding. In this article, some of the complexities of the reforms are considered, a detailed reading is provided of the various initiatives as an historical record, and the context(s) in which the steps forward and backward can be understood is reflected on. In light of the evidence, it is argued that if women's centres are to be successful in facilitating and supporting movements away from crime, then there is an urgent need for a consistent strategy derived from evidence‐based research and experience.
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19 |
ID:
159995
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Summary/Abstract |
In ‘The case for a participation income’, Anthony Atkinson identified unconditionality as an obstacle to support for a citizen's income. He advocated prioritising the universality and individuality of a citizen's income but replacing its unconditionality with a ‘participation’ requirement. At the time, Atkinson's critique read as political realism: to eliminate means‐testing, make a concession to the fear of free‐riding. Ironically, Atkinson remained opposed to unconditionality despite his own critical contributions to documenting the growing income and wealth inequality that have increased support for an unconditional basic income. In this article I consider the ‘participation’ requirement from a gender perspective in order to uncover the problematic notions of ‘dependence’, ‘independence’, reciprocity, and free‐riding that underlie normative arguments for conditional over unconditional benefits. Employing such a perspective demonstrates the superiority of unconditional benefits in achieving more efficient and effective income support and reducing inequality—Atkinson's core commitments throughout his distinguished career.
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