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MONOPOLY RENTS (2) answer(s).
 
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1
ID:   183044


Analyzing the returns and rate of return regulation of Finnish electricity distribution system operators 2015–2019 / Collan, Mikael; Savolainen, Jyrki; Lilja, Emma   Journal Article
Collan, Mikael Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Electricity distribution prices have steeply increased in Finland since 2015. This research investigates the returns from the Finnish low-voltage electricity distribution business and compares them to returns from three European industry indices. The within-industry distribution of returns is also studied. The Finnish rate of return regulation model used is presented together with the level of allowed returns by the model, four changes to the model are proposed, and the effect of the four proposed changes on the returns allowed by the model are investigated.
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2
ID:   160573


Monopoly rents and foreign direct investment in fixed assets / Wright, Joseph ; Zhu, Boliang   Journal Article
Wright, Joseph Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract In the past two decades, much of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the primary sector has flowed to unconventional, politically risky destinations. This presents a puzzle for theories that emphasize the ex post immobility of—and hence high potential expropriation risk for—fixed asset investment. Existing theories overlook one critical aspect of fixed assets: large capital requirements and high sunk costs act as entry barriers, resulting in market concentration and strong firm incentive for monopoly rent extraction. Personalist dictatorships, we posit, provide an attractive institutional environment for fixed asset investors. In such systems, the control of key economic sectors by the families of leaders, combined with a lack of institutional constraints, facilitate rent-seeking activities. We find that personalist dictatorships receive significantly more foreign investment in the primary sector, and fixed-asset intensive industries in general, than other regimes. This study highlights the importance of accounting for heterogeneity among investors and political regimes to understand the politics of FDI.
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