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ID:
176593
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study aims to analyze Kuwaiti foreign policy toward the ongoing “Gulf crisis” that emerged on June 5, 2017. This crisis caused an unprecedented break in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman. Three of the six severed diplomatic relations with Qatar; Kuwait and Oman have maintained neutrality. Why did Kuwait not join Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt to boycott Qatar?
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| 2 |
ID:
160668
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| 3 |
ID:
176541
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Qatar Gulf crisis of 2017 saw a number of mediation initiatives, including those of the United States and Kuwait. However, the two countries present two substantially distinct models of third-party intervention: superpower mediation (the United States) and small-state mediation (Kuwait). Comparing the two types of intervention in this crisis in terms of their ability to de-escalate tension and effectively resolve the Gulf crisis with respect to three variables – timing of mediation, leverage of the mediator (hard power versus legitimacy) and interest of the mediator – it would seem that small-state mediation has been more effective in crisis de-escalation, while superpower mediation has further exacerbated the crisis.
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