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ID:
156954
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| Summary/Abstract |
President Donald Trump’s much-anticipated 21 August speech promised to roll out a new strategy for America’s 16-year-old war in Afghanistan. (Afghans themselves have been at war for nearly 40 years.) Those hoping for meaningful change were disappointed. The decision to do more of the same and expect different results underscores a broader strategic bankruptcy within the US national-security establishment that is eroding trust in American leadership.
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| 2 |
ID:
156959
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| Summary/Abstract |
Autonomous weapon systems are prone to proliferation, and are likely to lead to increased crisis instability and escalation risks.
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| 3 |
ID:
156958
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| Summary/Abstract |
Ever since Donald Trump won the US presidential election, governments and pundits all over the world have been agonising about the direction American foreign policy will take under his watch. Is he a traditional ‘America First’ isolationist who fears ‘entangling alliances’ and therefore wants to soften commitments to Europe and East Asia? Is he bent on a clash of civilisations with the Muslim world? Does he want to team up with Russia in order to contain China’s rise? Or is he, above all, a mercantilist who sees trade restrictions as the only way to improve the lot of the American working class?
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| 4 |
ID:
156956
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| Summary/Abstract |
Globalisation, shifting power dynamics and the growing availability of the internet and other communication technologies have significantly changed the environment in which autocrats operate. Some observers have concluded from these changes that citizens now hold the upper hand, and that dictators’ days are numbered.1 The centralisation of power, according to this argument, is a requisite of dictatorship. In a world in which power is diffusing across NGOs, corporations, and wealthy and technology-empowered individuals, dictators will soon find themselves unable to build and maintain the power needed to uphold their repressive systems of rule.
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| 5 |
ID:
156962
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| Summary/Abstract |
There was a time when America’s heartland was seen as critical to the nation’s strength. Its food, factories and coal powered the nation; its men and women fought its wars; and its white-picket-fenced small towns evoked the American dreams of foreigners. During the Cold War, none other than Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev visited one such town – Ames, Iowa – because he was ‘curious to have a look’ at America while in the country for meetings in 1959.
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| 6 |
ID:
156957
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| Summary/Abstract |
The greatest challenge for the West in dealing with Iran stems not so much from its behaviour in the Middle East, or even its nuclear programme, as from uncertainty about its ultimate strategic goals.
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| 7 |
ID:
156952
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| Summary/Abstract |
Western relations with Russia are in a dangerous state. In the United States, evidence of Russian meddling in the 2016 election has produced a rare bipartisan consensus of inflexibility towards Moscow. President Donald Trump’s long-stated goal of improved relations is thwarted, not least by the ongoing investigation of possible collusion between his campaign and Russian intelligence agencies. Yet, the goal itself is worthy. After all, Trump’s two immediate predecessors had similar hopes for a better rapport with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Both failed. Putin and many of those around him are hard-edged autocrats, and there will likely be no easy way to put US–Russian relations fully back on track as long as they are in power. But it should be possible to reduce the risks of rivalry and war by focusing on what may be, in Putin’s mind, the fundamental cause of the problem: NATO expansion.
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| 8 |
ID:
156960
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although the ultimate political success of the Gulf War remains contested, the United States’ military success was staggering.1 US conventional war-fighting abilities – largely untested in combat since Vietnam – demonstrated the potential of the information revolution, as precision-guided munitions enabled pinpoint strikes against regime targets and global positioning system (GPS)-guided troops manoeuvred in the desert with unprecedented coordination.2
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| 9 |
ID:
156955
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| Summary/Abstract |
NATO should move to a safer, more secure and more credible nuclear deterrent – including withdrawing, and not replacing, US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.
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| 10 |
ID:
156953
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| Summary/Abstract |
North Korea’s missile programme has made astounding strides over the past two years. An arsenal that had been based on short- and medium-range missiles, along with an intermediate-range Musudan that repeatedly failed flight tests, has suddenly been supplemented by two new missiles: the intermediate-range Hwasong-12 and the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Hwasong-14. No other country has transitioned from a medium-range capability to an ICBM in such a short time. What explains this rapid progression? The answer is simple. North Korea acquired a high-performance liquid-propellant engine (LPE) from a foreign source.
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| 11 |
ID:
156961
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| Summary/Abstract |
Mikhail Gorbachev wanted to revitalise the moribund Soviet system by giving socialism a ‘human face’, thereby securing for his country an honourable place in the vanguard of world history. Even though this Tolstoyan undertaking ended in Shakespearean tragedy, horrendous slaughter was avoided and great things were achieved.
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