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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
192618
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| Summary/Abstract |
Several variables are critical to the future course and outcome of the current war. The most important is the morale factor on both sides. Wars are fought by people. The willingness of soldiers to die for their country and of the civilian population to bear the consequences of war is a key factor in a state’s readiness for total war. And Ukrainians are fighting as one. Russian attacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure in November 2022 aimed to undermine their will to fight. But the available data from summer 2023 does not suggest that the Ukrainian public’s faith in victory has decreased, nor that their willingness to make territorial or other concessions has increased. Unfortunately, one can make an expert guess that support for the war in Russia is also considerable. Protest from the Russian population is meagre, lukewarm, and sporadic. The Russians are unhappy that they are not winning the war; for the time being, they are indifferent to the suffering in Ukraine; there have been no mass anti-war demonstrations. Even Western anti-war activists do not go to Moscow’s Red Square to organise protests as in the past they demonstrated in front of the White House in Washington.
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| 2 |
ID:
192617
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russia is not a superpower, and it is not a conventional great power either. Russia is a balancing great power (balancer), which since 2007 has been purposefully offsetting western influence in the international system and attempting to resist Western (American) hegemony. The paper develops the argument that the failed aggression against Ukraine has very significantly limited Russia’s ability to use available balancing techniques. Ukraine has clearly opted for a Western orientation because Russia has entirely lost its appeal. Russian positions in Central Asia and the Caucasus are weakened. In both areas, Russia must confront the growing activities of the EU, the US, China, and Turkey. Russia’s ability to manage an equilibrium between China and India in Asia is diminishing as it can no longer export sophisticated weapons. Russia’s conventional military capabilities have been significantly reduced. All in all, Russia’s relative position among the other great powers has deteriorated significantly.
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| 3 |
ID:
160747
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| Summary/Abstract |
The V4 or Visegrad countries — the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia — have turned to the West for many reasons, including in order to advance technologically and economically, for political and administrative models, as well to gain military and political protection. The V4 countries are aware that their active and successful engagements within NATO and the EU are only possible in close cooperation with Germany. The V4 countries and Germany have had many opportunities to develop their mutual cooperation in the sphere of defense. However, defense cooperation seems to be underdeveloped within the forum of the V4 states as well as with Germany. The V4 platform clearly remains an unattractive tool for German military cooperation with Central European countries and has shown very limited potential even for its members. Germany does not have high expectations for the V4 alliance in terms of relevance as a security institution.
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| 4 |
ID:
167782
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article focuses on the evolution of the narrative of the Munich Myth, which interprets the Munich Conference and the capitulation of Czechoslovakia in 1938, as it was constructed and distributed by state authorities in Czechoslovakia, and later the Czech Republic, between 1945 and 2015. The article frames the evolution of the narrative in the context of political and social changes to examine how deeply such changes affected the narrative. The results demonstrate that changes in external conditions projected remarkably into the evolution of the narrative. However, the key message of the Munich Myth — the message of Czech smallness, which determined not only defeatism in this particular case but also general passivity in IR — endured, basically intact, for 70 years.
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