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GOLDBLUM, BETHANY L (3) answer(s).
 
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1
ID:   160990


All hands on deck: advancing safeguards for naval nuclear materials / Reddie, Andrew W; Goldblum, Bethany L   Journal Article
Goldblum, Bethany L Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract With the continued use of unsafeguarded naval nuclear-propulsion programs in all nuclear-weapon states, the commissioning of an Indian nuclear submarine, and the potential investment in such programs by non-nuclear-weapon states including Brazil and South Korea, movement toward a regulatory regime for nuclear material in the naval sector has become imperative. Such a framework faces a recurring debate on adequately protecting sensitive military technology while delivering assurances that naval nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear-weapon programs. In this viewpoint, we examine various prospective mechanisms to regulate naval nuclear stocks and assess them in terms of their effectiveness and scope. Drawing on lessons from the drafting, negotiation, and implementation of the Model Additional Protocol, we recommend a safeguards regime for naval nuclear material via a protocol that supplements the existing global nuclear-governance system. This protocol provides a standardized yet flexible approach to naval nuclear-material safeguards across all states (whether nuclear-weapon states, non-nuclear-weapon states, or outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) to handle variations among naval nuclear fuel cycles and technologies.
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2
ID:   192872


Evidence of the unthinkable: experimental wargaming at the nuclear threshold / Reddie, Andrew W; Goldblum, Bethany L   Journal Article
Goldblum, Bethany L Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Ongoing nuclear modernization programs in Russia, China, and the USA have reopened longstanding debates among scholars concerning whether tailored nuclear weapons are likely to have destabilizing consequences for international security. Without data to adjudicate this debate, however, these discussions have remained entirely theoretical. In this article, we introduce an experimental wargaming platform, SIGNAL, to quantify the effect of tailored nuclear capabilities on the nuclear threshold in a simulated environment. We then compare these results with a survey experiment using scenarios related to military basing, cyber operations, and nuclear threats from the wargame environment. While the survey experiments suggest that the presence of tailored nuclear capabilities increases the likelihood of conflict escalation, this trend diminishes in the wargaming context. Across both data-generating processes, we find support for the proposition that lower-yield nuclear weapons are used as a substitute for their higher-yield counterparts. These results have consequences for recent and ongoing policy debates concerning strategic posture and the future of arms control. This work also makes methodological contributions to the design and application of experimental wargaming for social science research, particularly for scenarios where data are limited or non-existent.
Key Words Nuclear Weapons  Experiments  Wargaming 
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3
ID:   160987


Framework for assessing alternate proliferation pathways in the age of non-state actors / Bevins, James E; Laderman, Sarah; Goldblum, Bethany L; Katzenson, Elie   Journal Article
Bevins, James E Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract While the nonproliferation community has long acknowledged the possibility of nuclear terrorism, its prevention has become a central focus area in recent years. For decades it has been assumed that, with access to special nuclear material (SNM), the steps to indigenously develop an improvised nuclear device are within the reach of non-state actors. At the same time, indigenous production of SNM has generally been dismissed as infeasible. Recognizing how recent trends of technology democratization, the open exchange of information, and globalization have eroded certain barriers to proliferation by non-state actors, this research explores the pathways a non-state actor could take to indigenously develop SNM and develops a method to determine the comparative attractiveness of each pathway, given the current capabilities of non-state actors. Additionally, it considers avenues for further investigation to identify countermeasures for SNM production, including countermeasures specific to non-state actors.
Key Words Terrorism  proliferation  Fissile Materials 
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