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ID:
164666
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article scrutinizes the role of diplomats in foreign policy by focusing on the case of Sir Percy Loraine, British ambassador to Turkey (1934–1939). Accordingly, the article first introduces an agent-centered framework claiming that the ability of diplomats to make their mark on foreign policy is contingent upon how they fare in overcoming two types of dilemmas on diplomatic duty: the mandate dilemma and the allegiance dilemma. The article then discusses how Loraine overcame these dilemmas with a particular focus on his mediating role in the establishment of bilateral economic and political partnership. Overall, the article argues that diplomats can make a difference in the conduct of foreign policy by influencing not only the host government but their own government as well, provided that they find a balance between following orders and using own discretion and between their loyalty to the government they represent and responsibility to the receiving government.
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| 2 |
ID:
174173
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article aims to offer a valid answer to the question why Turkey’s official stance on the Cyprus problem experienced frequent shifts - from indifference (1950) into supporting colonial rule (1954) then into Taksim, or partition (1956) and, finally, into independence (1959). Drawing upon the main assumptions of neoclassical realism, it argues that the existing systemic explanations in the scholarly literature that focus on Cold War rivalry are insufficient to grasp why there were such remarkable shifts in Turkey’s Cyprus policy in the 1950s. Instead, the article will focus on the domestic dynamics to make better sense of these policy changes. Accordingly, it will first discuss the main assumptions of neoclassical realism as a sound theoretical framework. Second, it will scrutinise in detail how Turkey experienced such shifts in its Cyprus policy throughout the 1950s. Third, the article will discuss the extant literature that overwhelmingly concentrates on systemic explanations for Turkey’s volte-face in Cyprus. In response, the article will offer alternative explanations by focusing on Turkey’s depleting resource extraction capacity and the political leadership of Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, in order to fully understand the underlying reasons behind Turkey’s shifting Cyprus policy.
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| 3 |
ID:
161195
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article seeks to explain how Britain and Turkey established a partnership in the second half of the 1930s despite the fact that they failed to agree upon a common rival to stand against. The prevailing International Relations literature highlights the existence of a common enemy as an essential component of alliance formation in world politics. The paradox underlying the British–Turkish partnership was the absence of a common enemy, since Britain was mainly disturbed by the revisionist policies of Germany, while Turkey was threatened by Italy's aggressive policy over the Mediterranean. In this respect, the article will first discuss how the academic literature explains the essential components of alliance formation in international relations. The second section will discuss in detail how British and Turkish threat perceptions diverged emphasizing the lack of a common rival. The final section will discuss how a bilateral partnership was successfully forged despite the absence of a common rival. Overall, the article argues that Britain and Turkey formed a partnership without a common enemy, as they shared a common fear of abandonment, i.e. the fear of losing an actual or a potential ally to an enemy.
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