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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
160707
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| Summary/Abstract |
Many intelligence services around the world maintain mechanisms intended to help minimize the risk of erroneous intelligence assessments. One of the best-known mechanisms is the ‘devil’s advocate’ whose goal is to present – sometimes artificially – an intelligence assessment that contradicts the prevailing view. The goal of this practice is to try to encourage doubts, both among intelligence assessors and among decision-makers. This paper will describe the importance and function of the 'devil’s advocate' mechanism in intelligence. Using Israel as a test case, the paper will seek to draw conclusions regarding the desirable format of operations of this mechanism.
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| 2 |
ID:
160705
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| Summary/Abstract |
Collection of important information is a critical part of the intelligence business. Less recognized and studied is the differential use of types of intelligence information based on personal and organizational preferences for, and biases against, specific intelligence collection disciplines, or ‘INTs’. This article presents a framework for assessing the implications of ‘favorite INTs’ for policy-making, policy implementation, and intelligence analysis. The record shows that favorite INTs negatively influence analysts and the use of intelligence by senior political leaders and military commanders. Practitioners can improve intelligence support and scholars can better understand how intelligence influences decision-making by appreciating how and why favorite INTs develop and influence decision-makers and analysts.
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| 3 |
ID:
160709
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 1937–1938 a divide emerged over Italian appeasement between Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden. Chamberlain wanted to appease Mussolini with de jure recognition of his Ethiopian conquest. Eden disagreed and even resigned over the matter. Historians have struggled to define clearly Eden’s resistance. The intelligence archive allows for a reassessment of British policy towards Italy and Eden’s resignation. It shows that secret intelligence was central to Eden’s decisions and demonstrates the importance of intelligence in diplomatic history. It shows that Eden, almost alone, correctly read ambiguous intelligence on Mussolini and recognized him as an enemy of Britain.
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| 4 |
ID:
160703
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| Summary/Abstract |
Question-asking is central to intelligence. Despite recognition of the importance of questions, in the absence of empirical research, much of what we understand about question-asking within the intelligence process remains speculative or limited to personal experience and memory. To develop an evidence-based approach to improving intelligence, this paper argues that empirical research into the questions that intelligence analysts ask is required. Drawing on insights from educational research, an initial set of research questions is proposed to understand the questions that intelligence analysts actually ask.
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| 5 |
ID:
160710
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 1949 intelligence reform efforts have resulted in extensive studies on every aspect of the intelligence community. One common aspect of commission comment has been how policy-makers interact with the intelligence products, commonly known as the producer–consumer relationship. Decades of successive commissions identify the same or similar problems with the relationship and recommend organizational changes aimed at improving the analyst – policy maker interaction. Eventually, the same issues arise because most structural reforms are incapable of addressing critical aspects of this relationship. Future efforts should first consider previous commission results as well as understand what reforms can and cannot impact this relationship.
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| 6 |
ID:
160704
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article looks to answer the question of why the James Bond novels and films should matter to scholars of intelligence and national security. We argue that Bond is important because, rightly or wrongly, and not without inaccuracy, it has filled a public knowledge vacuum about intelligence agencies and security threats. On another level, this article explores the unexpected yet important interactions between Bond and the actual world of intelligence. We contend that the orthodoxy dictating that Bond and spying are diametric opposites—one is the stuff of fantasy, the other is reality—is problematic, for the worlds of Bond and real intelligence collide, overlap and intermesh in fascinating and significant ways. In short, Bond is important for scholars because he is an international cultural icon that continues to operate at the borders of fiction and reality, framing and constructing not only public perceptions but also to some degree intelligence practices. Core narratives of intelligence among not only the public but also policymakers and intelligence officers are imagined, sustained, deepened, produced and reproduced through and by Bond. We conclude that Bond and intelligence should be thought of as co-constitutive; the series shapes representations and perceptions of intelligence, but it also performs a productive role, influencing the behaviours of intelligence agencies themselves.
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| 7 |
ID:
160711
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| Summary/Abstract |
Knowledge underlies rational choice between options. Predictive optimization is the prioritization of options according to their predicted outcomes based on available knowledge. The epistemological justification of predictive optimization is based on positivism, which asserts that facts and laws about the world exist and are discoverable. However, knowledge of human affairs in strategic adversarial interactions is often severely limited and erroneous: residual uncertainty is often vast. This results especially from deception and innovation by the adversary which introduce deep Knightian uncertainty. Consequently, predictive optimization is unreliable: outcomes may differ substantially from predictions. An alternative strategy for prioritization of options is info-gap robust satisficing: achieve critical goals (that are adequate but perhaps suboptimal) over a wide range of deviation of reality from current knowledge. The epistemological justification of robust satisficing is based on extending positivism to acknowledge and manage the unknown. Prioritization of options by robust satisficing manages both the limitations of knowledge and the need for achieving critical goals. This critique of positivism is not constructivist. Rather, we extend positivism to account for highly deficient knowledge. We present several examples and conclude by discussing the relation between inductive, abductive and deductive inference.
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| 8 |
ID:
160706
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| Summary/Abstract |
While most histories of SOE tend to emphasize the importance of sabotage and subversion in meeting Churchill’s injunction to ‘set Europe ablaze’, this article argues for a wider understanding of the functions of SOE by focusing on its operations in Crete. With a particular emphasis on the role and influence of Tom Dunbabin, the article shows that SOE in Crete took on a much broader range of functions than commonly understood. They extended into the realm of politics and diplomacy in pursuit of the larger aim of discouraging rather than promoting the use of violence in preparation of a peaceful transition to a post-war order.
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| 9 |
ID:
160708
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| Summary/Abstract |
Some public health crises and disasters represent threats to national security. In 2010 and 2011, Haiti experienced a cholera disaster surpassing all others in the world following a catastrophic earthquake. A novel integrated intelligence system, the Haiti Epidemic Advisory System (HEAS), provided critical information indicating the United Nations was the accidental source of the cholera disaster. This report reviews the operational context of the HEAS in relation to traditional public health surveillance and the role of intelligence in the determination of biological threat attribution.
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