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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
190377
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| Summary/Abstract |
Economic statecraft has become an increasingly prominent part of China’s foreign policy toolkit. Beijing has often sought to use both economic coercion and inducements to achieve its political goals, albeit to mixed results. In that vein, Chinese leaders have attentively watched how the United States has deployed its economic power, including US-led sanctions on Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. This recent episode has underscored America’s continued global financial power and highlighted to Beijing its potential economic vulnerabilities, as well as the risks of international opprobrium. At the same time, Washington faces challenges in assembling a durable global coalition to exert pressure on Moscow, due to economic dependencies on Russian energy and political reticence outside of a core bloc of allies.
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| 2 |
ID:
170977
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| Summary/Abstract |
What explains variation in how a patron manages its existing alliance with a client state when improving relations with an adversary? I theorize that the patron’s alliance management strategy is influenced by the client’s degree of bargaining power over its patron. Bargaining power derives from the availability of an outside option. Using archival and interview evidence, I show variation in alliance bargaining dynamics during US–China rapprochement. While the United States was dismissive toward South Korea, China was highly placating toward North Korea, making concessions and providing compensation. However, China became more dismissive during Sino-South Korean normalization, when North Korea’s bargaining power decreased. The findings have important policy implications for understanding how a patron could simultaneously manage alliance and adversary relationships.
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| 3 |
ID:
161260
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| Summary/Abstract |
Most analyses of China's foreign and security policies treat China as a unitary actor, assuming a cohesive grand strategy articulated by Beijing. I challenge this conventional wisdom, showing how Chinese provinces can affect the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. This contributes to existing research on the role of subnational actors in China, which has focused on how they shape domestic and economic policies. Using Hainan and Yunnan as case studies, I identify three mechanisms of provincial influence – trailblazing, carpetbagging, and resisting – and illustrate them with examples of key provincial policies. This analysis provides a more nuanced argument than is commonly found in international relations for the motivations behind evolving and increasingly activist Chinese foreign policy. It also has important policy implications for understanding and responding to Chinese behaviour, in the South China Sea and beyond.
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| 4 |
ID:
181842
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| Summary/Abstract |
With the globalization of Chinese capital, economic statecraft has become an increasingly prominent component of China's foreign policy. In this article, I examine China's use of economic inducements in developed democracies, a topic of growing concern for policymakers, focusing on the case of Australia. I show how Beijing's attempts to coopt public voices and influence Australia's foreign policy using non-transparent political donations and academic funding generated a strong backlash. At the same time, economic interdependence has provided a buffering effect, with key domestic actors in Australia advocating for cooperative relations, although this effect can in turn be limited by Beijing's coercive economic tactics. My findings underline the reputational costs of certain approaches to economic statecraft, the value of building supportive coalitions, and the challenges faced by China's authoritarian state capitalist model. They also highlight the impacts of globalized Chinese capital in developed democracies, including the resilience and vulnerabilities inherent in democratic political processes.
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