| Summary/Abstract |
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (K.R.I.) experienced economic prosperity following the years of the U.S. occupation in 2003. In 2005, the region attained its semiautonomous status, and up until 2014 benefited from its constitutionally mandated share of the central budget and increased foreign investment, which came primarily from neighbouring countries. The 2014 economic downturn of the region started with the halt of transfers from the central budget, deepened with the drop of oil prices and ISIS’s occupation of Mosul, and continued with the September 2017 independence referendum. Due to the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (K.R.G.’s) reliance on Turkey’s oil pipeline for autonomous revenue, as well as on foreign companies to extract its oil and gas reserves, the region’s economic livelihood strongly depends on healthy diplomatic relations with neighbouring countries. These states, however, are directly opposed to the K.R.G.’s movement towards secession. After the independence vote, regional powers, along with Baghdad, adopted an aggressive rhetoric and implemented punitive measures towards the K.R.I., placing the economic interests of the K.R.I. at odds with its nationalistic aspirations. As the ramifications of the referendum continue to unfold, the Kurdish push for independence on a political basis subsequently threatens the K.R.I.’s economic prospects as well as the privileges that its citizens enjoyed with their semiautonomous region during the post-U.S. occupation period. Focusing on this period, this paradox is examined. The tension between independence and the economy is discussed, and avenues for synthesizing the multiple goals of the K.R.G. and its people are explored.
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