|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
170045
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
China seems determined to maintain sound relations with all the major players in the region, to keep a low profile and to avoid costly entanglements.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
176509
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In response to North Korea's nuclear weapons program, South Korea is quietly pursuing an independent conventional counterforce and countervalue strategy. This strategy is unique. Few, if any, nonnuclear states have sought to rely on advanced conventional capabilities to deter a nuclear-armed adversary. Why is South Korea pursuing a conventional counterforce and countervalue strategy, and what could its impact be on strategic stability on the Korean Peninsula? South Korea's approach should be understood as both a short- and long-term hedge against U.S. abandonment. Its deterrent effect, no matter how uncertain, acts as a short-term stopgap if the United States abandons South Korea. Over the long term, capabilities such as advanced ballistic and cruise missiles bolster South Korea's nuclear latency. At the same time, we highlight that the strategy poses numerous technological and operational difficulties and has negative implications for arms race and crisis stability. Given South Korea's approach and North Korea's response, disarmament efforts focused purely on the bilateral U.S.–North Korea relationship will not succeed. Rather, any agreement will now need to address the growing gap in the conventional balance of forces on the Korean Peninsula.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
161508
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes China’s use of issue-linkage strategies in its approach to nuclear proliferation. It highlights that China has used its ties to nuclear proliferators as a bargaining chip vis-a-vis the United States. The United States is dependent on Chinese cooperation to secure nonproliferation objectives such as a non-nuclear Iran, and China has used this dependency to extract side-payments for its cooperation. Moreover, Beijing has used non-cooperation on nuclear proliferation as retaliation when the US has hurt its interests in unrelated policy areas, such as through arms sales to Taiwan. In contrast with past studies, the article claims that China’s approach to nonproliferation remains partly transactional to this day.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
191604
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Amid an intensifying rivalry with the United States, China is modernizing and significantly expanding its nuclear forces. These developments fuel concerns that China's traditional nuclear strategy premised on a limited nuclear arsenal for assured retaliation and a no-first-use policy is undergoing a major shift. Using Chinese-language materials, an examination of Chinese debates about China's security environment and the future direction of its nuclear strategy finds that a nuclear-conventional entangled security dilemma is emerging between the United States and China. The shift in the conventional balance of force in the region and the U.S. development of lower-yield nuclear weapons has led to greater fears in China of U.S. limited nuclear use in a conflict. Chinese strategists increasingly believe that U.S. nonnuclear strategic capabilities threaten China's nuclear forces. Although there is limited evidence of a shift in its nuclear strategy, China is changing its strategic posture to ensure its second-strike capability, including by relying on advanced conventional weapons (e.g., counterspace capabilities, cyber weapons, and electronic warfare) that can target U.S. missile defense. The dynamics of an entangled security dilemma may weaken arms race stability, and they underscore why it will be challenging for the United States to engage China in nuclear arms control.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
193968
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
China’s nuclear expansion has fueled debates about its nuclear strategy. In this article, I argue that there is still little evidence to suggest that China’s strategy has changed. The expansion can best be explained as an effort to bolster China’s second-strike capability, and it is primarily driven by increasing concerns about US missile defense as well as nuclear and conventional counterforce weapons. This is in line with assumptions of the nuclear revolution theory, which stresses the importance of secure second-strike forces. So far, China’s nuclear modernization does not align with the “delicate nuclear balance” school, which sees strong incentives for states to adopt competitive nuclear policies and attempt to obtain strategic superiority. The findings further highlight how US policy choices will have a significant influence on China’s future nuclear posture. A strong US response to China’s expansion will feed arms race dynamics and increase the risks of China fielding destabilizing weapons.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
186996
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Technological shifts have made nascent nuclear arsenals more vulnerable. This article examines how this affects nuclear hedgers—that is, states deliberately seeking nuclear latency or the capability to develop the bomb. It argues that growing vulnerabilities provide hedgers with increasing incentives to acquire sophisticated ballistic missiles. Possession of missiles is crucial to limit the ‘window of vulnerability’ between a nuclear breakout decision and the attainment of a nuclear arsenal with deterrence value. The article illustrates this tendency through a case-study of the Iranian missile and rocket programs. It finds that missile acquisition has indeed been an integral part of Iran's hedging strategy, and that several of the systems it has acquired indicate an interest in nuclear weapons delivery. Furthermore, Iran's sophisticated missile arsenal significantly shortens its path to a credible nuclear deterrent. The article contributes to the proliferation literature, which has overlooked that the development of missiles is an increasingly important element of contemporary nuclear hedging. Its findings show that missiles increasingly need to be considered in scholarly assessments of states' nuclear latency and hedging, and in discussions about how difficult it is to acquire nuclear weapons. Moreover, the findings indicate that practitioners working to prevent proliferation should prioritize tracking missile programs.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|