| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
191010
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The race to rapidly decarbonise and digitalise the global economy by 2030 to avoid temperatures rising above 1.5C has been subsumed by geopolitics that remains anchored in realist power struggles, now revolving around Sino-American hyper-competition. The Russian invasion of Ukraine further undermined interdependence and prompted unprecedented levels of economic statecraft. Access to indispensable minerals for a net zero future has thus become more securitised. The European Union (EU) has pushed back against bipolar geopolitics by utilising its normative, economic and regulatory power and strong networks of global institutional relations to maintain a competitive but working relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Such an approach may help broker broader global institutional collaboration to ensure that decarbonisation is for all, not just for the few.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
161511
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In 2008, rare earth minerals (REMs) shot to the top of the international agenda. When China began restricting exports of these critical materials, many claimed it was threatening a “REMs weapon” against the US and Japan. Yet by 2014, the crisis had quickly abated, as China shelved its policies in the face of pressure from consumer governments. This article examines why REMs emerged – and then quickly disappeared – as a threat to international security in Asia. It first conceptualizes the geopolitics of critical materials, before analyzing the politics of the REMs crisis between Japan, China, and the US. It argues that China’s ability to use REMs for diplomatic coercion was inherently weak and is unlikely to pose a similar threat to international security in future years.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|