| Summary/Abstract |
A reliable capability is essential for deterrence to succeed. While incredible threats coupled with an assured ability to hurt an adversary may be enough to alter behavior, even the most credible threat is left impotent in the absence of a sufficient capability. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union at times sought weapons with first-strike potential that threatened the effectiveness of each other’s deterrent. Since then, though, nuclear powers have either committed to a no first use policy or generally refrained from pursuing technologies that could radically upset the strategic balance. Recent trends, however, again pose a threat to this stability. Nascent “left-of-launch” missile defense programs which rely on offensive cyber operations or electronic warfare to target adversary weapon systems prior to launch offer new opportunities for sophisticated state actors to subvert the reliability of these capabilities. This paper assesses what risks there may be to nuclear weapon delivery systems before examining why a country might be motivated to carry out such an act, what the ramifications for deterrence stability might be, and how these threats could be mitigated.
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