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ID:
175089
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| Summary/Abstract |
The evaluation of the effectiveness of surveillance technology in intelligence agencies and oversight bodies is notably lacking. Assessments of surveillance technology concerning legal compliance, cost, and matters of privacy occupy a solid place, but effectiveness is rarely considered. Bureaucracy may explain this absence. Applying James Q. Wilson’s observations on bureaucracy reveals that effectiveness is minimally treated because it is more difficult to evaluate than budget assessments and legal compliance, and because intelligence outcomes are unobservable and difficult to oversee. Effectiveness evaluation is thus fettered by bureaucracy. Considerations of bringing in effectiveness assessment must appreciate the realities of bureaucratic constraints to be successful.
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| 2 |
ID:
161531
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| Summary/Abstract |
Intelligence agencies routinely use surveillance technology to perform surveillance on digital data. This practice raises many questions that feed a societal debate, including whether the surveillance technology is effective in achieving the given security goal, whether it is cost-efficient, and whether it is proportionate. Oversight bodies are important actors in this debate, overseeing budgets, legal and privacy matters, and the performance of intelligence agencies. This paper examines how oversight bodies evaluate the questions above, using documents produced by American and British oversight mechanisms.
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