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| 1 |
ID:
188824
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| Summary/Abstract |
A two-stage game investigates how counterterrorism measures affect within-country competition between two rival terrorist groups. Although such competition is commonplace (e.g., al-Nusra Front and Free Syria Army; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army; and al-Fatah and Hamas), there is no theoretical treatment of how proactive and defensive measures influence this interaction. Previous studies on rival terrorist groups are solely empirical concerning group survival, outbidding, and terrorism level, while ignoring the role that government countermeasures exert on the rival groups’ terrorism. In a theoretical framework, alternative counterterrorism actions have diverse impacts on the level of terrorism depending on relative group sizes and government-targeting decisions. In the two-stage game, optimal counterterrorism policy rules are displayed in terms of how governments target symmetric and asymmetric terrorist groups. Comparative statics show how parameter changes affect Nash or subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes.
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| 2 |
ID:
161554
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| Summary/Abstract |
We construct a model of the consequences of terrorism on trade, where firms in trading nations face different costs arising from domestic and transnational terrorism. Using a dyadic dataset in a gravity model, we test terrorism’s effects on overall trade, exports, and imports, while allowing for disaggregation by primary commodities and manufactured goods. While domestic and transnational terrorism have marginal or no significant influence on the overall trade of primary products, both types of terrorism significantly reduce the overall trade of manufactured goods. This novel finding for a global sample indicates the avenue by which terrorism reduces trade and suggests why previous global studies that looked at all trade generally found modest impacts. Moreover, both domestic and transnational terrorism have a detrimental effect on manufactured imports. The larger apparent reduction for transnational terrorism is not statistically different from that of domestic terrorism. A more mixed picture characterizes the effect of terrorism on exports. Domestic terrorism reduces manufactured exports and increases primary exports, while transnational terrorism reduces primary exports. Placebo tests support our hypothesized causality.
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