| Summary/Abstract |
Alexander J. Field (2014, 54) argues that game theory “offers little guidance, normatively or predictively, in thinking about behavior or strategy in a world of potential conflict.” He makes this claim by attributing to John von Neumann a view of the superpower relationship during the Cold War period that has no basis in fact and inferring policy prescriptions to that view that are simply not there. Field also suggests that Thomas Schelling's explanation of the “event that didn't occur” leads to the conclusion that “deterrence works because we are human, not because we are entirely rational” (Field 2014, 86). In this essay I show that there is at least one logically consistent game-theoretic explanation of the absence of a nuclear war during the long-peace of the 1950s and early 1960s. I also demonstrate that Field's assumptions lead to exactly the opposite conclusions; that is, that mutual deterrence can in fact be reconciled with rationality and that game theory is a powerful tool for understanding interstate conflict.
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