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FORTUNATO, DAVID
(2)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
177187
Attributing Policy Influence under Coalition Governance
/ Fortunato, David
FORTUNATO, DAVID
Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract
Coalition governance divides policy-making influence across multiple parties, making it challenging for voters to accurately attribute responsibility for outcomes. We argue that many voters overcome this challenge by inferring parties’ policy-making influence using a simple heuristic model that integrates a number of readily available and cheaply obtained informational cues about parties (e.g., their roles in government and legislative seat shares)—while ignoring other cues that, while predictive of real-world influence, are not suitable for heuristic inference (e.g., median party status and bargaining power). Using original data from seven surveys in five countries, we show that voters’ attributions of parties’ policy-making influence are consistent with our proposed inferential strategy. Our findings suggest that while voters certainly have blind spots that cause them to misattribute policy responsibility in some situations, their attributions are generally sensible and consistent with the academic research on multiparty policy making.
Key Words
Coalition Governance
;
Attributing Policy Influence
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2
ID:
162220
Cabinet durability and fiscal discipline
/ Fortunato, David
FORTUNATO, DAVID
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract
We argue that short government durations in parliamentary democracies increase public spending by driving a political budget cycle. We present a revision of the standard political budget cycle model that relaxes the common (often implicit) assumption that election timing is fixed and known in advance. Instead, we allow cabinets to form expectations about their durability and use these expectations to inform their spending choices. The model predicts that (1) cabinets should spend more as their expected term in office draws to a close and (2) cabinets that outlive their expected duration should run higher deficits. Using data from 15 European democracies over several decades, we show that governments increase spending as their expected duration withers and run higher deficits as they surpass their forecasted life expectancy.
Key Words
Fiscal Discipline
;
Cabinet Durability
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