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ID:
169872
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| Summary/Abstract |
European electricity markets are characterised by a multitude of (mainly national) approaches for ensuring security of supply. Although concerns regarding possible interaction effects between different market designs have been raised occasionally, the scientific research on capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRMs) primarily focusses on different design options in single markets. The research concerning possible spsill-over effects, positive or negative, in adjacent markets is lagging behind. This is the case for the effects of CRMs as well as for the effects of insufficient investment incentives. We address both topics in this paper.
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| 2 |
ID:
162292
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| Summary/Abstract |
Italy is currently implementing a Capacity Remuneration Mechanism (CRM) in a power sector that is paradoxically characterised, at least for the time being, by a significant overcapacity. This article aims at building a critical review of the Italian CRM design. It first presents the Italian context, explaining how the discussion started more than a decade ago and how it evolved since then. Then, it provides an in-depth description and critical analysis of the mechanism under proposal, based on its main design elements, keeping always as a reference the guidelines issued by the European Commission on CRMs. Many valuable lessons can be extracted from the Italian experience to shed light on other similar processes currently under development.
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| 3 |
ID:
193719
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| Summary/Abstract |
The policy and regulatory debate raised after the 2022 energy crisis has reaffirmed capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRMs) as a key element of the electricity market design required to drive the much-needed energy transition. Reliability options are a CRM product that effectively addresses the market failures impacting security of supply, while minimising the interference with the different segments of the energy market. This article provides a comprehensive and detailed assessment of the design elements of reliability options and advances recommendations that can be useful for regulators who may consider introducing this scheme in their electricity markets. The analysis benefits from lessons learned in those power sectors where reliability options have been implemented (Colombia, ISO New England, Ireland, Italy, and Belgium). This allows to narrow the gap between the theoretical debate and the real-world implementation of these mechanisms.
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