Summary/Abstract |
Since the post–war era, understanding Japan’s security rhetoric and actions
presented certain incongruities. While the constructivist arguments underscore that
the influence of post–war antimilitarist norm shaped Japan’s security behavior, it
contradicts the realist underpinnings influencing Japan’s choices. To understand
Japanese post–war security orientation and comprehend the rapidly unfolding policy
shift, this paper explores three sets of questions: firstly, what are the competing
schools of thought in the Japanese security debate? What are their core arguments
on key issues including Article 9 of the Constitution, potency of the Self–Defense
Forces (SDFs), nature of the U.S.–Japan alliance and historical narratives of Japan’s
past? What are the inter-school and intra-school fault lines? Secondly, what are the
drivers that propelled the dominance of each school at different time frames? How
does the factional power struggle in the domestic political landscape enable each
school to maximize their space and influence in the current security discourse?
More specifically, why did mercantilists remained the dominant political force
throughout the Cold War? In contrast, what led to normalists gaining momentum
and substituting mercantilism as a potent force in the post–Cold War period?
Thirdly, how have political elites pursued their competing agendas and critically
analyze the case of Shinzo Abe? What are the influences that shaped his values?
What are the methods he employed to pursue his ambitions of making Japan a
“normal” nation? And how did he consolidate his political strength and manage to
realize concrete policy objectives?
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