Search Result

Srl

Item

ID: 186717

Everywhere and Nowhere: Information Literacy in the Political Science Classroom / Thornton, Stephen ; Atkinson, Douglas B

Atkinson, Douglas B	Journal Article
	0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)

Summary/Abstract

Recent research suggests that many faculty members believe that their students are lacking the information literacy (IL) skills needed to be successful in their college career. Reports also suggest that there is a broader issue about the uncertain position of IL in the university curriculum. This article uses data from a worldwide survey of political science faculty to better understand how widespread this perception is, what is being done about this perceived problem, and what steps can be taken to encourage faculty to implement IL training in the classroom. We find that faculty believe that there is a problem but many are not explicitly teaching IL as part of their courses. We also find that faculty members who have received IL training are far more likely to include it in their courses. This leads us to suggest that IL training should be provided at the faculty level, which will have positive downstream effects on the IL training that students receive. We also contend that IL deserves a more prominent place in the university curriculum.

Key Words

Information Literacy ; Political Science Classroom

In Basket

Export

ID: 162763

When states resist: regime type, relative power, and militarized compellent threats / Viskupic, Filip ; Atkinson, Douglas B

Filip Viskupic Douglas B Atkinson	Journal Article
	0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)

Summary/Abstract

What explains state responses to militarized compellent threats? We propose it is not only the power distribution between target and challenger but the interaction between power distribution and regime type. Leaders of democratic and nondemocratic regimes adhere to different strategies of political survival. As democratic leaders have larger winning coalitions and provide public goods, we anticipate that as power distribution shifts in their favor, democratic targets will have a higher likelihood of complying with compellent threats. However, as democratic states become weaker, they cannot protect the members of their winning coalition from bearing the costs of a reputation for weak resolve and therefore have incentives to resist compellent threats. Nondemocratic leaders have smaller winning coalitions and provide private goods, so the power disparity should have little effect on the responses of nondemocratic states. An analysis of militarized compellent threats from 1918 to 2001 provides support for our argument.

Key Words

Democracy ; Reputation ; Compellent Threats ; Crisis-Bargaining

Links

'Full Text'

In Basket

Export