| Summary/Abstract |
This article explains the Carter administration’s retreat from supporting self-determination as a human right for Palestinians. It therefore moves beyond the focus by many scholars on the “heroic diplomacy” employed by Jimmy Carter, Anwar Sadat, and Menachem Begin leading up to and during the Camp David Summit, and instead examines Carter’s Arab-Israeli diplomacy in a broader international context that takes into account his larger policies towards the Palestinians and his emphasis on human rights in the conduct of American foreign relations. By looking beyond the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt – the agreement that led to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace treaty in 1979 and the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian sovereignty -- and focusing instead on Carter’s policy toward the Palestinians during his presidency, a more complex picture about Carter’s support for Palestinian self-determination begins to emerge that raises questions about his commitment to human rights abroad.
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| Contents |
This article explains the Carter administration’s retreat from supporting self-determination as a human right for Palestinians. It therefore moves beyond the focus by many scholars on the “heroic diplomacy” employed by Jimmy Carter, Anwar Sadat, and Menachem Begin leading up to and during the Camp David Summit, and instead examines Carter’s Arab-Israeli diplomacy in a broader international context that takes into account his larger policies towards the Palestinians and his emphasis on human rights in the conduct of American foreign relations. By looking beyond the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt – the agreement that led to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace treaty in 1979 and the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian sovereignty -- and focusing instead on Carter’s policy toward the Palestinians during his presidency, a more complex picture about Carter’s support for Palestinian self-determination begins to emerge that raises questions about his commitment to human rights abroad.
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