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ID:
162944
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| Summary/Abstract |
The use of auctions for determining the level of renewable energy remuneration is increasing. A cause for concern is the resulting potential to exclude smaller investors from the market, in particular community energy projects. However, empirical evidence and examination of resulting consequences have been insufficient so far. This article analyses the effects a shift from guaranteed remuneration to auctions might have on incentives to start new community wind projects, analysing the case of Germany. It thus contributes to research on investor-specific impacts of renewable energy policy instruments. An explanatory sequential mixed-method design was applied, combining surveys and interviews for the collection of expert assessments. The developed typology allows the assessment of the respective potential of different wind project types for procedural and distributive justice, which are understood to support local acceptance. Wind projects developed by the local community were found to be most beneficial for local acceptance, but appear to face the highest challenges in auctions. A crowding out of these projects would be particularly unfortunate with regard to the need to expand wind energy capacities much more. It is recommended that policy makers ensure a level playing field, also within the context of auctions, for wind projects developed by the local community.
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| 2 |
ID:
176734
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| Summary/Abstract |
Renewable energy auctions have been lauded for bringing about price reductions. However, the methods applied in investigating such impacts have so far been inadequate and often do not allow conclusions to be drawn as to whether observed price reductions were caused by auctions or by other factors. We have analysed the outcomes of the first onshore wind auctions in Germany held in 2017 and 2018, taking into account the site-specific wind conditions and realisation deadlines of the successfully bid projects. Our results show that after a temporary reduction, prices exceeded both the initial levels and the transitional feed-in tariff. A lack of public acceptance and numerous legal complaints against building permissions have contributed to bids falling below auction volumes in 2018. These results are discussed against the backdrop of the functional and structural promises associated with the introduction of auctions, including reduced remuneration levels, better control of the pace of the capacity expansion and who is able to influence the setting of the remuneration levels.
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