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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
178340
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the past decade, food security and nutrition practices have become central in the promotion of resilience in protracted crises. Such approaches have been welcomed by the aid community because of their potential for linking relief and development. Social and political analysts, however, have criticized resilience approaches for failing to consider power relations and because they entail an acceptance of crisis or repeated risk. In this context, regimes of food security and nutrition practices have become increasingly targeted, privatized and medicalized, focussing on individual behaviour and responsibility rather than responsibility of the state or international actors. This article uses examples from Sudan to examine how and why the resilience ‘regime of practices’ has functioned as a form of neoliberal governmentality, and argues that it has created a fantasy in which conflict in Darfur is invisible. This allowed food aid to be withdrawn and removed the need for protection despite ongoing conflict and threats to livelihoods; thus crisis-affected populations have been abandoned.
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| 2 |
ID:
193273
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| Summary/Abstract |
Somalia has a long history of famine and humanitarian crisis. This article focuses on the years 2008–2020, during which governance and aid practices changed substantially and which include three crisis periods. The article examines whether and how governance analysed as a political marketplace can help explain Somalia's repeated humanitarian crises and the manipulation of response. We argue that between 2008 and 2011 the political marketplace was a violent competitive oligopoly which contributed to famine, but that from 2012 a more collusive, informal political compact resulted in a status quo which avoided violent conflict or famine in 2017 and which functioned to keep external resources coming in. At the same time, this political arrangement benefits from the maintenance of a large group of displaced people in permanent precarity as a source of aid and labour.
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| 3 |
ID:
163396
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| Summary/Abstract |
Inequality is a major determinant of access to food in Sudan, with power, wealth and services concentrated within a central Sudan elite, leaving much of the country marginalized, impoverished and suffering repeated emergencies. This article discusses how food aid both contributed to the state’s exclusionary development process and tried but failed to assist crisis-affected populations in its peripheries. In the 1950s, food aid explicitly aimed to support the state but from the late 1980s, emergency food aid bypassed the state and its manipulation led to economic and political benefits for the Sudan government and its closely-aligned private sector. By the 2000s, the Sudan government controlled international food aid and established its own food aid apparatus, which it could use to further its political and military goals. New resilience-based food technologies developed in the aftermath of the 2008 food crisis, and applied in Darfur, have unintentionally facilitated the government’s strategies. This article argues that the ‘actually existing development’ resulting indirectly from food aid has benefited the government and private sector but has left most people facing a protracted emergency.
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