Query Result Set
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:1302Hits:18760481Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search
  Hide Options
Sort Order Items / Page
JEONG, JIN MUN (2) answer(s).
 
SrlItem
1
ID:   182558


Coercive Diplomacy and Foreign Supply of Essential Goods: Effects of Trade Restrictions and Foreign Aid Suspension on Food Imports / Jeong, Jin Mun   Journal Article
Jeong, Jin Mun Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract Economic sanctions constrain targets’ capacity to maintain essential goods imports from foreign suppliers. This research points out that target states may respond to this adverse effect of sanctions by redirecting the resources invested to secondary goods imports to essential goods imports. In addition, I suggest that the availability of this strategy significantly varies across sanctions instruments. When facing foreign aid sanctions, targets may be able to effectively reallocate their import funding to sustain foreign supply of essential items. However, when they are subject to trade sanctions, such a response is not readily available. In the data analysis with 150 countries from 1974 to 2006, I utilize foodstuffs as a proxy of essential goods and provide evidence that targets under foreign aid sanctions transfer their import funding to maintain adequate amount of food aid. Yet, I find no evidence that targets subject to trade sanctions also respond with the same manner.
        Export Export
2
ID:   163445


Domestic Institutional constraints, Veto players, and sanction effectiveness / Jeong, Jin Mun; Peksen, Dursun   Journal Article
Peksen, Dursun Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract What effect do the domestic institutional constraints in target states have on sanction outcomes? Other than the narrow focus on political regime type, little is known about how the institutional makeup of target states might affect leaders’ ability to adjust their policies to defy sanctions. We assert that the size of veto players in targets is a crucial yet overlooked institutional factor in explaining sanction effectiveness. We contend that political leaders subject to the approval of multiple veto players are more likely to concede as they are less likely to develop polices to counter the sanctions. We assess the empirical merits of our theoretical claims by combining data on sanctions from the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions data set with the veto points data from the Political Constraints data set. Results from the data analysis for the 1946 to 2005 period indicate that the size of veto players is a significant predictor of sanction success even when we control for political regime type and other major political and economic covariates of sanction effectiveness.
        Export Export