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| 1 |
ID:
163389
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| Summary/Abstract |
Donald Trump appears to have intensified the danger of U.S. allies wanting their own nuclear weapons, but such concerns are exaggerated. U.S. alliances are more resilient than commonly presumed with actual force deployments, which don’t appear to be changing any time soon, mattering more than rhetoric to make security guarantees adequate for the foreseeable future.
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| 2 |
ID:
163385
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Executive Director of the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy contends that the concept that has guided the U.S. military for a generation–the two-war construct, or the ability to fight two simultaneous wars against regional powers–is no longer the central basis to evaluate the potential performance of the U.S. military.
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| 3 |
ID:
163391
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| Summary/Abstract |
When it comes to the future of the international order, we are now in a new Age of Anxiety. The international order will persist, but it will be less West-centric and fragmented. Although the rules will be more contested, that will not necessarily be politically violent or morally bad, but it will be more bottom-up–increasingly built upon regionalization and coordination.
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| 4 |
ID:
163390
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| Summary/Abstract |
Are U.S. alliances permanent elements of the global security architecture or temporary phenomena? Although there are reasons to question U.S. alliances’ indefinite continuation, the U.S.-Korea alliance remains desirable for four reasons, with two possible future force structures.
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| 5 |
ID:
163386
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| Summary/Abstract |
Deeply versed in the challenges of long-term competition during the Cold War, the United States has had the luxury of neglecting this competency for more than a generation. Washington must reacquaint itself with 12 bedrock principles of long-term competition if it hopes to succeed in the geopolitical rivalries playing out today.
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| 6 |
ID:
163392
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| Summary/Abstract |
Pakistan’s nuclear policy is heavily influenced by 1960s NATO flexible response strategy, and has essentially imported its contradictions into Islamabad’s own. The consequences are apparent: emulation has raised serious questions about Pakistan’s “full-spectrum deterrence” credibility, deterrence stability and future measures to manage regional security competition.
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| 7 |
ID:
163393
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Pakistan Army’s prior reluctance to use nuclear weapons has been neither because of deterrence nor a nuclear taboo, but the absence of military utility so far. Those conditions when Pakistan might determine that a nuclear first-strike has military utility and would be ethically justified, however, are constantly being considered today.
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| 8 |
ID:
163388
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the grand scheme of power shifts, concerns over China’s rise are overblown. China is far from issuing an outright challenge to the United States and is likely to continue avoiding one for some time. U.S. strategists need to recognize that an overly assertive response to China’s rise is counterproductive.
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| 9 |
ID:
163387
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| Summary/Abstract |
A career diplomat argues that Germany is more fundamentally challenged than others by the recent turn in international affairs because of its optimism since 1989. Now, a wide-ranging debate on future German foreign policy is only just beginning with Berlin’s answer potentially determining the fate of the European project.
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