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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
169928
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| Summary/Abstract |
China is fighting a tough battle against separatist terrorism perpetrated by militant Muslim Uyghurs in the far-western region of Xinjiang. De-radicalization is one of the policies the authorities in Xinjiang have recently taken to address the upsurge in terrorist violence. This paper consists of five parts. The first part deals with the background against which the de-radicalization strategy was conceived and developed. The second part discusses several major approaches to the strategy such as “five keys,” “four prongs,” “three contingents,” “two hands,” and “one rule.” The third part presents custodial, post-imprisonment, and social programs for targeting three groups of people: imprisoned radicals, released radicals, as well as those who are radicalized but not prosecuted. The fourth part describes programs for engaging communities in order to win over politically reliable people from civil society for support in de-radicalization. The last part draws a conclusion regarding the characteristics of, effectiveness of, controversies over, and future of the Chinese de-radicalization campaign.
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| 2 |
ID:
163700
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nigeria has recently joined the many states which have established de-radicalisation programmes. The article engages with debates on how the success of de-radicalisation can be ascertained given the substantial flaws of using individual-oriented recidivism rates as a measure. Many studies on de-radicalisation emphasise the need to consider the programme’s context to facilitate success, yet ‘context’ has been under-conceptualised and approached statically. The paper provides greater agency to ‘the context’ in distinguishing between the type of milieus former combatants are re-integrated into and how these emergent social relations shape the scope of de-radicalisation programmes, beyond the traditional over-emphasis on programme participant outcomes as measures of success. The Nigerian de-radicalisation programme has a broader function insofar as it provides former combatants with ‘scripts’ of disengagement and function as a brand, signalling to communities that former combatants have repented and are ‘better citizens, imbued with genuine nationalism’ that resonate with local communities.
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| 3 |
ID:
164147
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article discusses the shortcomings of the “de-radicalization doctrine” in sub-Saharan Africa. The issues raised are illustrated by the war against Boko Haram, which involves Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Relying on interviews with security officers, insurgents, civil servants, displaced people, humanitarian workers and Muslim and Christian clerics in Nigeria, Niger and Chad since 2005, the investigation shows that the four states focused on repression rather than demobilisation programs in prison or outdoors. The Boko Haram crisis is mainly a story of mismanagement. The article thus challenges the assumptions of the “de-radicalization doctrine” in Muslim Africa South of the Sahara. First, attempts to de-radicalize jihadi terrorists tend to focus too much on religious fanaticism and the exegesis of the Quran. Secondly, they are neither feasible nor efficient. Finally, they obscure priorities that are more important to counter extremism and demobilize insurgents.
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| 4 |
ID:
187999
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article discusses a recent phenomenon of radicalization among university students in Indonesia, with special attention to what may be called “pseudo-radicalists” (i.e., a group of students who have been exposed to radical ideologies); however, they are not strongly grounded in an exclusive and extreme religious viewpoint that justifies militant attitudes and violent actions. We carefully and critically examine the extent to which educated youth have been infiltrated by radical influences and how they de-radicalized themselves. Our research includes seven government tertiary institutions identified by the National Agency for Combating Terrorism or Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme as having been inflicted by radicalism, namely, Universitas Indonesia, Institut Teknologi Bandung, Institut Pertanian Bogor, Universitas Diponegoro, Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember, Universitas Airlangga, and Universitas Brawijaya. By situating our case study within the existing literature on radicalization and de-radicalization, we hope that this article will enrich our perspectives and shed some light on crucial issues facing educated youth, especially within tertiary campuses.
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| 5 |
ID:
178944
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent interest in terrorist risk assessment and rehabilitation reveals the likelihood and risk factors for terrorist reengagement and recidivism are poorly understood. Informed by advances in criminology, this study develops a series of theoretical starting points and hypotheses. We test our hypotheses using data on 185 terrorist engagement events, drawn from eighty-seven autobiographical accounts, representing over seventy terrorist groups. We find terrorist reengagement and recidivism rates are relatively high in our sample and similar to criminal recidivism rates except in the case of collective, voluntary disengagements when an entire group chooses to disarm. We account for why we observe relatively high rates in this sample. With regard to risk factors, we find terrorists are less likely to reengage as they age. Radical beliefs and connections to associates involved in terrorism increase the likelihood of reengagement. Social achievements (marriage, children, employment) do not commonly serve as protective factors, at least in the short term, when controlling for beliefs and connections. Finally, those from an upper or middle-class childhood family are less likely to reengage.
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