| Summary/Abstract |
It is generally perceived that administrative decentralization reform in young democracies is a promise to improve democracy from below. Yet, in terms of democratic development, the impact of this process is ambivalent, and can be described as a paradox of reform. This article argues that preemptive countermeasures that offset problems predicted to emerge as the reform proceeds should be formulated as part of the reform through introducing a preventive policy paradigm in the area of democratic reform policy. This is to alleviate or prevent the creation of the paradox and to contribute to democratic development through enhancing people’s satisfaction with the newly democratized government. To this end, this study examines administrative decentralization reform in South Korea and Indonesia and uncovers these reforms’ paradoxes. These two cases are particularly worthy of study, since their young democratic governments lack countermeasures against predictable reform problems, intensifying the paradox. I argue that the implications drawn from these two cases for methods of enhancing democratic development in other young democracies are worth heeding.
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