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| 1 |
ID:
163900
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| Summary/Abstract |
Jordan is one of the last bastions of stability in an otherwise volatile region. However, its stability is threatened by a continuing economic crisis. In a survey conducted across all twelve governorates in 2017, only 22 percent of citizens view Jordan’s overall economic condition as “good” or “very good” compared to 49 percent two years ago.
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| 2 |
ID:
163892
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| Summary/Abstract |
Haider al‐Abadi in September 2014 and his government's ability to stop the spread of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). However, further rapprochement is constrained by historical, social and geo‐political factors. Iraq‐Gulf relations are dynamic, complex and multifaceted. The three main political components in Iraq — Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds — all have different positions regarding the Arab Gulf states. The same can be said for the Arab Gulf states (members of the Gulf Cooperation Council), with each having a different interest and approach to deepening ties with Iraq. This paper discusses the historical factors shaping the current Iraq‐Gulf rapprochement, then analyzes the challenges and opportunities to its development.
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| 3 |
ID:
163896
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China's Marshall Plan, displays China's transition from a regional to a global power, with the ports of Karachi and Gwadar serving its naval influence and control.
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| 4 |
ID:
163895
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In 2013, China launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with the goals of securing China's energy sources and expanding its economic networks to the Asia‐Pacific region, North and East Africa, and the Mediterranean regions by way of Russia, Central and South Asia. Many of the BRI projects involve infrastructure building in China as well as in politically unstable or economically disadvantaged countries. To ensure a successful initiative and safeguard China's investments, issues of domestic and regional security become vital.
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| 5 |
ID:
163894
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After more than a decade of active animosity, relations between Iraq and certain GCC member states have been warming up. However, Iran will resist an inter‐Arab rapprochement at the expense of its own interest. Tehran has invested heavily in the coming to power of a friendly Iraqi Shiite administration. Isolated in the Middle East and facing active hostility from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Iran will do everything it can to sabotage normalization between Iraq and its Arab neighbors. It is a zero‐sum game in which any gain by Saudi Arabia and its allies is a loss for Tehran.
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| 6 |
ID:
163891
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| Summary/Abstract |
The ongoing reshuffle in the Middle East has generated new competition among regional powers, the resurgence of the Saudi‐Iranian rivalry being a major one. It is sectarian (Sunni vs Shiite), ethnic (Arab vs Persian), ideological (U.S.‐allied vs US‐opposed), and geopolitical. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia present themselves as the leaders of both the Middle East and the Muslim world, and their competition has expanded to include Africa. This research paper offers an analysis of the role of Africa in the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, touching upon the strategic importance of the continent's untapped natural resources and location. It will also analyze the effect of the rivalry on alliance formation and stability in Africa.
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| 7 |
ID:
163893
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| Summary/Abstract |
Rapprochement between Iraq and Saudi Arabia since 2014 started with of the rise of new political actors on both sides: Haider al‐Abadi and Muqtada al‐Sadr in Iraq and Muhammad bin Salman in Saudi Arabia. Both share pro‐Western attitudes and rivalry with Iran. Both were also seriously challenged by the temporary rise of ISIS, and the defeat of the organization by Abadi's Iraq prompted further cooperation to prevent its reemergence. Iraqi‐Saudi relations have a complex and fraught history. The new beginning, reaching its height with Prime Minister Abadi's visits to Saudi Arabia in June and October 2017, were accompanied by great expectations on the Iraqi side for major reconstruction projects. The Saudis are engaged in securing the hegemony of Muhammad bin Salman at home and in countering Iran regionally. For the Saudi government, Iraq is a zone of contention to be pulled from the Iranian orbit and to be denied as a battleground for radical groups like ISIS. The kingdom has come to terms with making the Shiite‐led government its main interlocutor instead of Sunni groups; but Riyadh is still waiting to fully engage.
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| 8 |
ID:
163901
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The non‐Jewish minority in Israel — Muslim Arabs, Christian Arabs, Druze, Circassians and Bedouins — has been a topic of ongoing research since the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948. The Arab sector is the largest in population. One of the key issues that concern scholars, and the Arabs themselves, is the political array within this minority.
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| 9 |
ID:
163898
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This article argues that President Putin’s securitization agenda stems from the second Chechen War and is far more pragmatic concerning Russian engagement in the Middle East than former Soviet policies. The Kremlin is intent on regaining leverage in its bilateral relationships with the United States and the European Union. Furthermore, in an era of economic hardship, Moscow is seeking out new regional relationships based on securing future liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply networks, nuclear energy contracts and defense cooperation. I will first address the background to the Russian intervention in Syria, move on to Russia‐NATO relations, and specify the driving factors for Russian intervention in Syria, how the air campaign gave way to diplomatic engagement, and what the prospects are for building longer‐term bilateral relations with other states in the Middle East.
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| 10 |
ID:
163890
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| Summary/Abstract |
The following is a transcript of the ninety‐fourth in a series of Capitol Hill conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council. The meeting was held at the Capitol Visitor Center in Washington, DC, on November 30, 2018, with Richard J. Schmierer, chairman of the Council's board of directors, moderating, and Thomas R. Matthair, the Council's executive director, serving as discussant.
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| 11 |
ID:
163899
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| Summary/Abstract |
No two other Arab countries match their consistent level of rivalry and hostility. Enmity has always been a constant feature of Syrian‐Iraqi relations — and it only partially ended with the demise of the Baath regime in Baghdad following the 2003 war. This article investigates the Iran‐Iraq War period (1980–88) and analyzes the factors that determined the conflict between Syria and Iraq. The war occurred when their hostility was at its peak, following the collapse of unity negotiations in 1979. From the early stages of the war, it was clear that Syria was backing Iran against its fellow Arab country. This hostility was interspersed by brief periods when Iraq attempted — ultimately unsuccessfully — to achieve rapprochement with Syria. As the war was ending in 1988, Iraq, in revenge, supported the anti‐Syrian Lebanese factions for no strategic purpose, just to irritate Syria.
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| 12 |
ID:
163897
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| Summary/Abstract |
Scholarship on Pakistan’s relations with its neighbors predominantly focuses on India, Afghanistan and, most recently, China. Little research is conducted on relations between Pakistan and Iran. This is an obvious gap, given the cultural and religious links between these two neighbors that share a 909‐kilometer border.
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