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ID:
172332
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| Summary/Abstract |
When do nonviolent protests escalate into violence? Existing literature has focused primarily on campaign-level escalations and only recently has work begun to examine protest event-level escalations. We build on this emerging literature and develop an argument for why some protests escalate to violence. We use statistical analysis and find that violent escalations are more likely to occur following recent repression and when protests are unorganized. Our results offer insight into the conditions in which protests remain peaceful and offer citizens a channel to pursue their goals as well as the conditions in which protests become violent and destabilizing.
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| 2 |
ID:
164169
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| Summary/Abstract |
From armed-building occupations to fisticuffs between protesters and police at otherwise peaceful demonstrations, protest violence is an essential part of the politics of protest. In this article, I argue that state capacity is central to understanding why some protests are violent. In particular, this article explores two facets of state capacity—coercive capacity and state authority—arguing that where the state is treated as a relevant authority, the likelihood that protesters will employ violent tactics decreases. Using original data on Mexican protest events, I demonstrate that higher levels of state authority reduce violent protest but that increased coercive capacity, especially where state authority is weak, is associated with a greater likelihood of protest violence. This article contributes to our understanding of the influence of state capacity on protest violence and suggests that attentiveness to subnational variations in state capacity can help us better understand the violence.
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| 3 |
ID:
167831
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| Summary/Abstract |
Does foreign direct investment (FDI) promote or hinder good governance in a host state? In this article, I analyze the effects of FDI on subnational-level corruption across 63 provinces in Vietnam and find that FDI has both promoted and hindered control of corruption. Initially, FDI creates resources and incentives to improve governance and reduce corruption for early winner provinces. Yet, once FDI begins to pour in, different dynamics start to take effect. While the resources and incentives accrued to FDI-recipient provinces become less effective in further curbing corruption as more FDI flows in, FDI provides leaders of those provinces with growing opportunities and increased abilities to seek and pursue rents, leading to a prevalence of corruption. Using both qualitative and quantitative data, I find strong evidence that the control of corruption is weakest at the extremes: in provinces with the least and the most FDI.
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