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ID:
164278
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| Summary/Abstract |
In May 1967, Abba Eban, Israel’s foreign minister, visited Washington. Israel was on the brink of the Third Arab–Israeli War, and Eban’s mission was to secure U.S. support for Israel in the coming war. Before coming to Washington, he had met with President Charles de Gaulle in Paris, who, fearing that the conflict might start World War III, proposed to Eban the idea of convening talks among “the four great powers” to prevent the war. When Eban explained de Gaulle’s proposal, President Lyndon B. Johnson irritably retorted, “What did he mean by ‘the four great powers’? Who the hell are the other two?”1
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| 2 |
ID:
168885
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| Summary/Abstract |
This analysis explores British perceptions and roles regarding the negotiation of the West German-Soviet Moscow treaty of 1970. Whilst supportive of West German Ostpolitik, Britain has received a very marginal role in the historiography of the treaty. By exploring the consultation process in the so-called Bonn Group of the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany, this exegesis explains that Britain played a leading role in building consensus and forming schemes to resolve the issue of the treatment of Quadripartite Rights and Responsibilities concerning Berlin in the Moscow treaty package. As background, this essay also explains the policies of the Harold Wilson’s Labour government and Edward Heath’s Conservative government regarding European détente in Europe, including West German Ostpolitik.
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