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SON, DAEKWON (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   164315


Flawed Assumption in Pro-Nuclear Arguments and South Korea's Strategic Choice / Son, Daekwon   Journal Article
Son, Daekwon Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract In this article I explore assumptions behind the aspiration for nuclear armament in South Korea. An increasing number of South Koreans advocate nuclear armament of their country, either by redeploying US tactical nuclear weapons or by developing an indigenous nuclear capability. Support for "going nuclear" reflects three beliefs: nuclear weapons can serve as a shield from external bullying, the balance of power between Seoul and Pyongyang has shifted due to Pyongyang's growing nuclear capability, and possessing nuclear weapons is the sole way to protect ROK national interests given growing skepticism over the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella. I revisit deterrence theory to demonstrate that these perceptions are based on the flawed assumption that nuclear weapons can only be deterred by other nuclear weapons. This assumption—an extrapolation from the Cold War experience—does not consider technological breakthroughs made since then. In fact, modern, technologically advanced conventional weapons can also deter nuclear weapons, especially those using relatively underdeveloped technologies. By continuously modernizing its conventional weapons and strengthening the ROK-US alliance, South Korea can deter Pyongyang from contemplating a nuclear assault on South Korea.
Key Words Nuclear Weapons  North Korea  South Korea  US 
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ID:   193215


When Beijing Chose Seoul over Pyongyang: China–South Korea Diplomatic Normalization Revisited / Son, Daekwon   Journal Article
Son, Daekwon Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract On 24 August 1992, China finally normalized its diplomatic relations with South Korea, notwithstanding North Korea's protestations. What made Beijing jettison its traditional friendship with Pyongyang and recognize Seoul? What did China want from Sino-South Korea normalization? By extensively unearthing hitherto unknown archival evidence, this paper argues that it was China's security concern about being besieged by pro-Soviet powers, rather than an ideological affinity with North Korea, that delayed Sino-South Korea rapprochement. In the same vein, the study posits that it was the gradual Sino-Soviet reconciliation from 1985 onwards that enabled Beijing to reconcile with Seoul. Furthermore, it argues that in the face of the sudden dissolution of the Eastern bloc and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Beijing hastily sought to secure a cordon sanitaire and foreclose the possibility of the formation of a US–Japan–South Korea anti-China united front by normalizing relations with Seoul.
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